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    The four essays in this publication were prepared in response to the request by Dr. 
Mahbub ul Haq, Special Adviser to the Administrator of the United Nations 
Development Programme. He asked that I prepare an analysis of the operation of the 
international economic system as it affects the developing countries, as a background for 
UNDP's Human Development Report 1992. Dr. Haq's specific question was: how 
efficient and equitable are the functionings of the present markets in commodities, 
manufactures, services and finance?  
    These are issues on which I have spent much of my working life, and I welcomed this 
opportunity to set out both the results of my earlier work and thinking, and the findings of 
the research specifically undertaken to throw light on the latest facts and ideas in these 
areas.  
    Three major impressions have emerged. First, developing countries have suffered and 
are now suffering from an enormous deterioration of their terms of trade. Their export 
commodity prices in real terms are lower than at any time in the last 10, 40 and 120 years. Their export prices of manufactures also are falling in relation to the manufactures 
they import during the last decade. This deterioration is at least partly responsible for the 
great fall in real wages which developing countries have been experiencing. Secondly, 
despite these price and income developments, developing countries have managed to 
achieve an advance in industrialization which was not considered possible by almost all 
observers several decades ago. These countries have left a major mark on international 
trade in manufactures, and a number of them have established efficient industries in many 
fields. Thirdly, most international markets remain dominated by the financial power of 
developed countries. This power concentration results in a lack of bargaining strength of 
developing countries in commodity markets, services markets and partly manufactures.  
    The work on these essays was completed at the end of November 1991. For purposes 
of the present publication, I have updated the material to April 1992, where relevant.  
    I owe much gratitude to colleagues and friends in international institutions dealing with 
issues of commodities, trade and development, and finance. All errors are mine.  
   
                                                                         Dragoslaw Avramovic  
   




Part I: International, Financial Market, Poor Countries, and Poor People  
A. INTRODUCTION  
    This chapter discusses the position of developing countries in world financial markets. 
The majority of these countries buy finance abroad: for investment in fixed and working 
capital; for financing a part of current expenditures in some cases: and for meeting 
shortfalls in external receipts, which frequently occur for reasons beyond their control.  
    The following section reviews the costs of international borrowing: after a period in 
the 1970s in which this costs was below the rate of price increases, leading to negative 
interest rates and excessive borrowing, it rose sharply in the 1980s to a level without 
precedent in the last hundred years. The increase affected particularly severely the debtor 
developing countries dependent heavily on export of primary products, whose prices fell 
simultaneously with the rise in the international rate of interest. The third section 
considers fluctuations in the volume of international market lending: this reached an 
unsustainable peak in the early 1980s, to be followed by a precipitous fall which pushed a 
large number of debtor countries into deflation and stagnation lasting a decade. This 
market failure affected both the countries which had borrowed excessively and some of 
those which had not. This section also reviews the emerging resumption of voluntary 
capital inflow into Latin America and the factors which are influencing it. The fourth section focuses on the activities of international financial institutions in meeting the needs 
of developing countries in the face of market fluctuations and collapse. These institutions 
filled a part of the needs in the early part of the debt crisis: but in the largest of them debt 
service reflows exceeded cash outflow as the 1980s progressed and they are now 
absorbing cash net from developing countries. This issue and the issue of loan 
conditionality are among the central in North-South economic relations. The fifth section 
examines the international management of the debt problem, particularly as it has 
affected the Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, the main debtor regions of the 
1980s. Some recent proposals for handling the debt problem are also reviewed. The last 
section discusses foreign private investment in developing countries: direct investment 
which has only now recovered from the debt and commodity shocks of the 1980s and 
which is heavily concentrated in some ten developing countries, although it also plays a 
considerable role in some smaller economies in view of its relative size, particularly in 
mining development, but has almost completely bypassed the least developed countries: 
portfolio investment in share (stock) markets of a limited number of developing 
countries, which has risen sharply in recent years in the expectation of high profits form 
price appreciation; and the rates of return on private investment projects supported by 
International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank. Questions are raised 
concerning sustainability of recent high returns in developing country stock markets and 
of interest rates currently charged in the international capital market on borrowings by 
developing countries.  
    Financial markets are generally considered efficient: funds move quickly from one 
placement to another in response to small changes in interest rates and security prices. 
The U.S. Government securities market -- a very important segment of the aggregate 
world financial market in view of the size of U.S. Government debt and many foreign 
holders of portions of it -- has been widely considered as the single most efficient market 
in this generally efficient industry, as reflected in razor-thin "spreads" or gaps between 
bid and asked prices. Government officials have claimed for years that this market is 
simply too big to be easily manipulated by a single participant.1 And yet, the events of 
the summer 1991 have shown that this is not true even for this market, as a major 
investment firm managed to buy large quantities of U.S. Government obligations and 
then fix their prices, on a number of occasions.  
    In the international financial market where developing countries have to borrow, 
inefficiencies abound, as shown in enormous price fluctuations over the short-term, in 
cycles of excessive lending and withdrawal from markets over the medium and long-term 
and in frequent arbitrary determination of prices and access to markets available to 
individual borrowers. This market can also be unfair, as shown in the recent experience: 
debt capital finance moved from the South to the North for years in the last decade, to 
reach a staggering cumulative sum of US $ 176 billion in 1984-90.2 The former President 
of the Bundesbank, Dr. Karl Otto Poehl, called it a "net resource transfer in the wrong 
direction."3.  
   
B. INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES  Growing fluctuations and rising trend in real terms  
    The following two charts show both the growing amplitude of fluctuations in interest 
rates over time and their upward trend in real terms. Chart 1. refers to the London Inter-
Bank Offer Rate, a standard used as a basis for fixing international interest rates over the 
short term; for individual borrowers a margin is added to reflect a specific country risk; 
and in all cases interest rates differ depending on the length of maturities. Chart 2 shows 
the average real long-term government bond yield in the Group of Seven (U.S., Japan, 
Germany, U.K., France, Italy and Canada). Table I below gives the specific data on 
individual country long-term bond yields over the last 100 years.  
Chart I: Real and nominal LIBOR, 1950-90 - not yet available 
Chart 2. Group of 7: Real interest rates - not yet available 
  
Table I. Long-term real interest rates in selected industrial countries, for selected years, 1890-1989 
(percent) 
   
Country  1890-99  1990-13  1955-59  1960-73  1974-79  1980-84  1985-89 
France  3.6a  2.0a  0.3  1.4  -0.9  3.1  5.1 
Germany, Fed. Rep.  --  --  3.9  2.7  2.8  4.8  4.0 
Italy  --  --  4.0  1.5  -3.7  1.9  3.6 
Japan  --  --  --  0.5  -0.2  5.7  3.9 
United Kingdom  2.6 b   2.0 b   1.3  2.5  2.1  2.7  4.1 
United States  4.5 c   1.7c   0.8  1.5  0.3  5.4  5.4 
   
Note: Long-term real interest rates are calculated by dividing long-term government bond yields 
by the GDP deflator.  
a. Government stock, b. Consols., c. New England municipal bonds.  
Source: World Bank data. 
   
    Interest rates in real terms in the 1980s and early 1990s were more than double the 
level that prevailed in most of the period for which data are available. In the eloquent 
phrase of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1983, interest rates had reached a point higher 
than at any time since Jesus Christ.  
   
Impact on developing countries  
    Increases in international interest rates are transmitted to the debtors in developing 
countries on an expanded scale as other related charges pile up, mainly on the ground of 
protection of the intermediary institutions against developing country risk. In Mauritius, a 
country with relative monetary stability, the effective domestic rate paid by the sugar 
industry on foreign borrowing, based on LIBOR of 10 percent per annum, worked out at 
18.5 percent per annum in early 1983; with LIBOR at 14.5 percent, it amounted to 23.3. 
percent. The domestic interest cost went up on account of the "country (borrower) risk" 
of 2.5 percent above LIBOR, premium for expected currency depreciation of 6 percent, 
and banking charges. 4 In 1983 in Latin America, where devaluations were much larger, "the effect on the individual private sector, which in [some] cases had been encouraged 
by the policies of the authorities to borrow, has been devastating:....the amount needed in 
local currency to service external debt has increased three or four times" in one year. 5 In 
the estimates of the Institute of International Finance Inc., Washington, D.C., each one 
percentage point change in the international interest rate used to change the amount of 
interest payments of developing countries by US$ 3-4 billion per year in the late 1980s. 
The effect is now smaller as a part of the debt has been shifted from a floating rate to a 
fixed rate basis. Nonetheless, the effect is still formidable.  
    The real interest rates shown in Charts 1 and 2 and Table I are calculated by deducting 
the increase in domestic prices of developed creditor countries from their nominal rate of 
interest. For developing debtor countries, the relevant real interest rate on their foreign 
debt is the nominal (money) interest rate adjusted by the rate of change in their dollar 
export prices. When these prices fall, more goods must be sold to pay the interest due 
which is fixed in money terms, i.e. the real rate of interest increases. As developing 
country export prices have been generally falling in the postwar period, the real interest 
rates they have been paying have been higher than the nominal rates stipulated in their 
debt contracts. During the commodity price slump in the first half of the 1980s, the 
average real rate these countries were paying amounted to close to 17 percent per year 
(Table II).  
Table II. Real interest rates paid by selected major debtors, 1980-85 
   
  1982  1983  1984  1985  Average 
Argentina  26.3  23.8  11.3  11.6  18.25 
Brazil  22.2  19.6  12.6  12.0  16.00 
Chile  33.8  8.9  21.6  8.4  18.20 
Mexico  27.4  16.9  9.9  15.0  17.30 
Nigeria  25.9  25.4  11.5  18.2  20.25 
South Korea  14.0  12.5  5.8  7.1  9.90 
Average  24.9  17.8  12.3  12.3  16.73 
   
Note:Real rates are nominal (money) rates adjusted by the country's export price index.  
Source: Dragoslav Avramovic, Developing Country Debts in the Mid-1980s: Facts, Theory and Policy, in Policies for 
Development, ed. by Sidney Dell, Macmillan Press, 1988. 
   
    These rates are more than three times higher than the rates experienced by developed 
countries in the same period.  
   
Prospects for future level of interest rates  
   
   
    The World Bank, in a 1991 staff study, believes that "there is a significant probability 
that real interest rates will remain relatively high in the 1990s because of several new or 
continuing claims on the world's resources that will maintain upward pressure on interest 
rates. Among these are the costs of German reunification, the continuing claims of the U.S. budget deficit, the need to strengthen the capital base of the U.S. and Japanese bank, 
the social and physical needs of Eastern Europe, the postwar reconstruction of Kuwait 
and Iraq, and the creation of a single internal market in Europe by 1992." 6  
    The record of interest rate forecasting has been generally poor. Nobody expected that 
interest rates in the U.S. today, on 8 October 1991, would amount to 5.12% (Federal 
Funds, short-term) and 7.7% (30 years U.S. Treasury bond), compared to 8% and 9.05% 
respectively, a year ago. It is the present recession in the U.S. which has driven down the 
interest rates and overwhelmed the forces discussed in the World Bank analysis. The 
benefits to developing countries of the decline in U.s. rates have been offset to a 
considerable degree through the renewed fall in commodity prices since mid-1989, and 
though interest rate increases in Germany and Japan.  
    From the long-run viewpoint, the crucial question is whether the profitability of 
investment in the leading developed countries has increased to a degree that it has pulled 
up the demand for real capital and the real rate of interest, and whether these factors will 
continue to operate in the future. OECD has estimated rates of return on capital stock in 
major industrial countries for the period 1975-1990, and this indicates a moderate 
increase in profitability (Table III).  
Table III. Rate of return on nonresidential capital stock in major industrial economies, 1975-90 
(profit income as a percentage of capital stock) 
   
Economy or group of economies  1975-79  1980-87  1987 1988  1989  1990
United States  17.0  16.8  18.7  19.3  20.0  19.8 
Japan  14.9  14.5  15.0  15.2  15.2  14.9 
Germany, Fed. Rep.  13.8  13.5  14.6  15.2  15.6  15.8 
G-7  14.8  14.7  16.0  16.5  16.8  16.7 
   
Note: The measure of return to capital is taken as the difference between value added at factor cost 
and compensation of employees (the gross operating surplus of enterprises). The capital stock is 
adjusted for inflation and covers only assets included in nonresidential gross fixed capital 
formation and hence excludes dwellings, inventories, monetary working capital, land, and natural 
resources.  
Source: OECD (1990). 
    But the computation excludes land, natural resources, inventories and monetary 
working capital, and it is not clear how this affects the profit rate: if prices of the 
excluded items have increased faster than the general price level, the increase in 
profitability has been less than shown or non-existent. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce collects data on rates of return in U.S. corporations. The series on 500 largest 
corporations shows an increase in profitability since 1970, although some indicators do 
not present a clear picture (Table IV).  
Table IV. 500 U.S. Largest Industrial Corporations -- Selected Financial Items: 1970-88 
   
  1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Return on stockholders' equity, percent  9.5 14.1 13.6 10.9 10.7 13.6 11.6  11.6  14.4 16.2
Return on sales, percent  3.9 4.5  4.3 3.6  3.8  4.5 3.9  4.1  5.1 5.5
Total return to investors (*), percent  6.5 21.6 1.4 21.2 30.2 -0.8 26.3 15.1  6.6 14.1   
Note:(*) Includes both price appreciation and dividend yield, i.e. to an investor in the company's 
stock.  
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract 1990. 
   
    Further work is needed in this area. If it is confirmed that an increase in profitability 
has taken place in developed countries, an important question is whether it is primarily 
due to productivity growth through accelerated technological advance or to reduction in 
real wages and in prices of inputs (energy and raw materials) many of which are 
imported; such reduction has taken place in wages in some countries and in inputs, and it 
is in principle reversible at least to some degree. If irreversible factors are at work, the 
implications would be far-reaching: further flight of capital from developing to developed 
countries and continuing and perhaps accelerated migration of both skilled and unskilled 
labour, unless massive public investment and a sharp and sustained increase in 
profitability takes place in developing countries on a broad scale.  
   
Coping with fluctuations  
    Fluctuations in interest rates can be moderated through policy actions of leading 
countries. This calls for international macro-economic coordination and for readiness to 
restore regulation of interest rates if necessary. An effective coordination in this field is 
unlikely to be possible without readiness of stabilize exchange rates; and restoration of 
regulation calls for a reversal of some elements of philosophy of economic policy which 
has been pursued by a number of developed country governments for a number of years. 
An alternative is a broad compensatory financing for debtor countries experiencing 
interest rate increases. At present, some financing can be obtained from the IMF through 
its Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility, "provided to members pursuing 
economic policies supported by the Fund under stand-by or other arrangements." 7 This 
financing is both limited and conditional. It is paradoxical that conditionality is imposed 
on the victims of interest rate increases which frequently result from policies pursued by 
their creditors.  
   
C. VOLUME OF LENDING  
Lending cycles  
    Professor F.W. Taussig, writing in 1927, described the cyclical nature of lending which 
has operated for a long time:  
"Loans from the creditor country, far from being granted at an equal annual rate, begin in 
modest amounts, then increase, and reach a crescendo. Usually they are granted in 
exceptionally large sums when a culminating phase of activity and speculative fever 
approaches, and during this phase they become over larger from month to month for as 
long as the upswing continues. With the emergence of the crisis, loans suddenly fall off or even cease altogether. Payment of interest on old loans is not any more compensated 
by the granting of new ones; interest becomes the net burden for the debtor country. A 
sudden reversal takes place in the balance of payments of the debtor country; it feels the 
consequence suddenly in the form of immediate need to make remittances in favour of 
the creditor country, pressure on its banks, in a high discount rate, in falling commodity 
prices. And this sequence may occur not only once, but two or three times in a row. After 
the first crisis and recovery, it is possible that the debtor country will manage to get on its 
feet. After several years the loans from the creditor country will start flowing again, 
another period of activity and speculative investment takes place, the old round gets 
repeated, until finally another crisis comes and another sudden reversal in the debtor 
country's balance of payments." 8 
   
    International lending, after a large expansion in the 1920s, stopped almost completely 
during the Depression of the 1930s and many defaults which accompanied it. It will 
always be a cause for wonderment how was it possible that the same sequence, to the 
Taussig's crescendo, occurred in the 1970s and 1980s again, despite the universally 
available knowledge, much better education and still vivid experience of inter-war 
speculation and tragedy. Moreover, it was in some leading international financial 
agencies that a doctrine of "debt-led growth" was proclaimed in the late 1970s, in pursuit 
of a broader view that markets could make no mistake and that commercial banks knew 
what they were doing.  
   
Financial transfer and its reversal, 1972-1990  
    Lending commitments to developing countries by the international capital market, 
mainly commercial banks, reached a peak of US $ 51 billion in 1981, on the eve of the 
eruption of the debt crisis in August 1992 when Mexico stopped paying. The market 
collapsed quickly thereafter. Table V sets forth the data on net transfer of funds (loan 
receipts minus debt service): the funds moved to developing countries until early 1980s 
and from developing countries to their creditors thereafter.  
Table V. Net financial transfers on long-term lending 1972-90, US $ billion 
   
Year  All developing 
countries 
Major borrowers 




1972  7.1  n.a  1982  20.1  11.1 
1973  10.8  8.1  1983  3.7  -6.3 
1974  16.7  10.5  1984  -10.2  -14.3 
1975  n.a.  n.a.  1985  -20.5  -21.2 
1976  21.5  n.a.  1986  -23.6  -20.0 
1977  25.0  n.a.  1987  -34.0  -17.1 
1978  33.2  17.2  1988  -35.2  -26.0 
1979  31.2  18.8  1989  -29.6  -21.2 
1980  29.5  15.1  1990 
(b)   -21.7  -13.7 1981  35.9  24.8  1991 (c) -23.4  -19.4 
   
Notes: (a) From 1978, "severely indebted countries', (b) Revised, (c) Projected.  
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1982-83 Edition, First Supplement, for 1972, 1976 and 1977; WDT 1983-84, for 1973 
and 1979; WDT 1984-85, for 1974 and 1978; WDT 1990-91, for 1980-89; and WDT 1991-92, for 1990 and 1991. 
   
    The data refer to disbursements. The latter normally lag behind commitments and 
therefore it took some time for the collapse of lending to be fully felt. The peak reverse 
flow of resources was recorded in 1988.  
    The collapse of capital inflow affected not only the countries which were experiencing 
debt servicing difficulties, but also others. According to an African Development Bank 
memorandum of 1988, in Africa "in particular, suppliers have become increasingly 
concerned about sovereign risk factors, especially the ability of governments and their 
central banks to make foreign exchange available to importers to meet their obligations. 
Furthermore, the world debt problem, associated mainly with Latin American countries, 
has caused the major international banks as a matter of policy, to sharply reduce their 
total cross border balance sheet exposure. This sharp reduction by commercial banks has 
hit Africa most. In several cases, e.g. Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire, banks have cut credit 
lines which they were willing to extend previously, even though these lines were properly 
serviced." 9  
   
Transfer cost  
    The mechanism through which reverse transfers have been extracted has frequently 
included devaluation of debtor country currencies significantly in excess of domestic 
inflation. The resulting greater profitability of export industries has led to export volume 
expansion and to a declining tendency for dollar export prices. Export sales have been 
maintained in the face of heavy competition, insufficient foreign demand, particularly for 
primary products, and frequent trade obstacles; a large number of primary producing 
countries have devalued one after another in order to be able to compete at low world 
prices; as demand is frequently depressed and does not respond to price cuts, the main 
result of devaluations in these cases has been to reduce real wages all around and further 
depress world prices.  
    During the great debate concerning payment of German reparations in the inter-war 
period, Keynes was of the view that debtors face the double burden: paying the debt 
service (budget burden) and experiencing a deterioration in their terms of trade (transfer 
burden). 10 This view was vindicated in the present debt crisis: the inelastic demand of 
the debtors for foreign exchange confronted the inelastic demand for the debtors' primary 
products, and the terms of trade gave in. The effect was a significant transfer of income 
of primary producers, which was additional to that reflected in the monetary amounts of 
debt service payments which they were making.      The experience of the 1980s with the transfer problem confirmed the earlier 
experiences:  
"When credits are no longer extended to the same degree as before, cash-hungry debtors 
begin to liquidate inventories. Prices of many commodities begin to fall, a phenomenon 
long described by economists. The fall in prices makes life much harder for the debtors, 
because the value of the dollars owed, in terms of those commodities they are producing, 
is rising. It may even happen, as Irving Fischer so magnificently put it in an article 
published in Econometrica, 1933, first quarter, that 'the liquidation of debts cannot keep 
up with the fall in prices which it causes. In that case, the liquidation defeats itself. While 
it diminishes the numbers of dollars owed, it may not do so as fast as it increases the 
value of each dollar owed... Then we have the great paradox which, I submit, is the chief 
secret of most, if not all, great depressions: the more debtors pay, the more they owe 
(Fischer's italics.)"11 
   
    This does not mean that the depression in Latin America and Africa, the two main 
debtor regions, and in debtor countries elsewhere during the 1980s, was due exclusively 
to the debt problem or that the entire fall in commodity prices can be attributed to the 
transfer problem. There also were other factors at work. But the collapse of international 
credit, the debt problem and the terms of trade deterioration did play a major role. In the 
judgment of the United Nations Secretariat, "if commodity prices, including oil, had 
remained at their 1980 levels throughout the decade, it is likely that the debt crisis would 
have been averted."12 The World Bank index of real commodity prices other than oil 
declined 41% and oil declined 50%, between 1980 and 1990.  
   
Human cost  
    Stagnation and decline in the reversal phase affected the lower income groups with a 
particular force. Real wages fell drastically in many countries. In Africa, non-agricultural 
wages fell 29 percent in 1980-86, or at 5.5 percent per year; and agricultural wages fell at 
6 percent per year in the early 1980s. These declines came on top of the declines which 
had occurred in the 1970s, thus making them even more difficult to bear. In Latin 
America, average non-agricultural wages fell 17% between 1981 and 1990, or at 1.5 
percent per year, minimum non-agricultural wages fell as much as 41 percent in this 
period (5.5 percent p.a.), and agricultural wages at 4.5% p.a. on the average in the early 
1980s. Unemployment and underemployment have increased almost everywhere. 
Adjustment programmes have not helped:  
"There was very limited attention in the first group of structural adjustment loans to the 
social implications of adjustment..." 13 "As the decade [of the 1980s] progressed, the 
impact of stabilization and certain types of structural adjustment on the most vulnerable 
and disadvantaged socio-economic groups became an important concern." 14 
"Adjustment-induced growth is proving to be a far-off achievement, and trickle-down has not reached the poor adequately. Because of the weight of human suffering we cannot 
simply sit back and wait for growth and adjustment to occur."15 
   
    Considerable attention is now paid to poverty problems in adjustment programmes; but 
its effects inevitably will be limited unless there is resumption of economic growth, 
increase in employment, and fairness in income distribution. These things are yet to 
come.  
   
    In a paper written in July 1987, I described the human situation in two key Latin 
American debtor countries at the peak of the debt crisis:  
"Minimum wages in Brazil are now estimated to be the lowest in 37 years.16 
Unemployment is increasing sharply -- the reported unemployed have almost doubled 
from January to March 1987.17 Real wages in Mexican manufacturing have been cut 
50% in five years.18 The Mexican exports, oil and non-oil, are now in a very good shape 
and foreign exchange reserves are up sharply; but the internal social pressures are 
enormous. One outlet -- illegal emigration to the United States -- is now more difficult as 
U.S. legislation and controls have been tightened. Horrifying stories of labour trying to 
cross illegally from Mexico to Texas in closed railroad cars through July heat in the 
desert and dying when cars get switched around, are indications of a desperate search for 
jobs at good wages. A Swiss newspaper has called it a Maginot line on Rio Grande."19 
    A recent report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean has described the current situation in the region, following the adjustment 
in the last decade:  
"Despite the fragility still displayed by some stabilization processes, most of the 
economies of the region are now functioning on new foundations. They are characterized 
in general by the consolidation of an export-oriented approach, greater external openness, 
fiscal austerity, more prudent management of monetary policy, and greater reluctance to 
engage in public regulation of economic activity, while the international financial 
community, for its part, is showing some tolerance with regard to the need for leeway in 
economic policy. Without doubt, these new forms of operation are based on even greater 
inequalities in income distribution than in the past, greater precariousness of 
employment, tighter fiscal restrictions and even less leeway for economic policy 
management. All this means less capacity to make transfers between economic sectors or 
social strata..."20 
   
   
Resumption of voluntary capital inflow into Latin America, 1991  
    It has come as a surprise that a considerable inflow of private capital seems to be 
taking place in Latin America in 1991. It is occurring both in countries which have 
achieved macro-economic stability and in those which have only recently embarked on 
adjustment processes or are still only groping towards them. In Argentina and Mexico, these flows include foreign direct investment which is partly connected with the 
privatization of public enterprises, but there are also cases of substantial portfolio 
investments and even moderate sale of bonds. Further, in these and other countries, such 
as Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil, there have been considerable inflows of short-
term capital.21  
    The key factors responsible for the resumption of capital inflow seem to be three: first, 
large difference between high real domestic rates of interest in these countries (partly 
linked to stabilization policies) and declining U.S. rates; secondly, expectations of large 
gains in domestic stock markets from price appreciation; and thirdly, confidence that 
these countries will give priority to maintaining convertibility of currencies, particularly 
for claims of foreign lenders and investors. Interest rates offered by Brazil have ranged 
from 11.66% (five year bonds) to 13.5% (two-year maturity) and by Argentina 11.3% per 
year (two-year bonds). U.S. interest rates for similar maturities now range from 5 to 6 
percent, or one-half the rates the Latin American countries are paying. Sustainability of 
Latin American capital inflow depends on the ability of these countries to continue to pay 
high interest rates and maintain convertibility of currencies in the face of slow economic 
growth, latent social tensions, uncertainty concerning returns on real investment and a 
likely level of commodity prices, and on the feasibility of continuing low U.S. interest 
rates.  
   
Note on capital flight and repatriation  
    It has been reported that a part of the present capital inflow into Latin America 
represents repatriation of capital held abroad by Latin American nationals. It is believed 
that capital flight was substantial, particularly from Mexico and Venezuela in Latin 
America, and the Philippines and some African countries, during several preceding 
decades. Many of the reasons for capital flight are domestic, but there is also an 
important reason of international nature. The upswing in interest rates in developed 
countries in the late 1970s and during the 1980s was a powerful stimulus for capital 
outflow from developing countries: for example, an interest rate in the U.S. for 
government securities or certificate of deposits guaranteed by the U.S. Government of 
9% p.a., risk-free, was a very attractive financial proposition. Moreover, interest earnings 
on bank deposits, including CDs, held by non-residents were, and are, tax-free. In 
Switzerland, interest on investments in the Euro-market, i.e. outside Switzerland, made 
through Swiss banks, are also tax-free, these investments are normally more risky, in 
principle, than investments in Switzerland itself; but it appears that this risk can be 
avoided by investing in foreign affiliates of Swiss banks.  
    If it is true, as it seems from the recent experience, that capital does come back when 
the interest rate differential is heavily in favour of the developing countries where the 
funds originated, repatriation can be stimulated by eliminating tax privileges on earnings 
from deposits owned by developing country nationals.  
   D. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
    The key international financial institutions, International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and its affiliates, and three regional development bodies -- Inter-American 
Development Bank Group, Asian Development Bank Group and African Development 
Bank Group -- have done two major things for the developing world. First, they 
continued and expanded their lending when the debt crisis struck in the early 1980s and 
thus helped absorb a part of the shock. Secondly, right from the start of their operations, 
in the late 1940s in the case of the Bretton Woods institutions and subsequently in the 
case of regional institutions as they were created, they transmitted, each in its own way, 
methods of analysis, implementation and monitoring of development activities important 
for economic advance. This included work on investment projects and sectors in the case 
of development finance agencies, and techniques of financial and monetary management 
in the case of the IMF and some of the other agencies.  
    Two major disappointments concern the insufficient staying power of some of them in 
providing finance during the debt crisis, and imposition by some of a type of 
conditionality which many borrowers have found difficult to accept and bear.  
   
Supply of international liquidity  
    The sharp upswing in IMF assistance to developing countries took place in 1981-85, 
and their debt to the Fund shot up from SDRs 7,442 million (US $ 9,525 million) in 1980 
to SDRs 34,776 (US $ 42,414) in 1986. This was the second fastest intervention of the 
Fund after lending to alleviate the consequences of the increase in oil prices in the 1970s. 
A sharp reversal occurred from 1986. In the five years 1986-90, net repayments to the 
Fund by developing countries amounted to SDRs 2,560 million per year; adding their 
payment of interest ("periodic charges"), the yearly net transfer from these countries 
worked out at SDRs 4,700 million per year, equivalent to US $6,300 million yearly -- a 
formidable figure on any reckoning. In the last year, ending 30 April 1991, the transfer 
was reduced sharply, to US $ 800 million (Table VI).  
    A part of repayment was done by developing countries running surpluses, e.g. South 
Korea; but at the same time a group of developing countries in difficulty incurred arrears 
which, had they been paid, would have raised the aggregate outflow.  
Table VI. IMF transfers to developing countries, 1980-91, SDRs mln. 
(-indicates transfers to IMF) 
   
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988  1989  1990 1991
Disbursements   2211 4386 6960 10258 10164 6060 3941 3307 4562  2682  5266 6823
Repayments  3574 2811 1894 1488 2129 2943 4702 6749 8463  6705  6399 5608
Net capital inflow (1-2)   -1363 1575 5066 8770 8035 3117 -761 -3442 -3901 -4023 -1133 1215
Income from loans  n.a.  n.a.  1097 1545 2364 2969 2740 2089 1865  1719  1825 1825
Net transfers (3-4)   n.a.  n.a.  3969 7235 5671 148 -3501 -5531 -5766 -5742 -2958 -610
Net transfers in US $ mil equiv.   n.a.  n.a.  4366 7597 5558 163 -4271 -7854 -7798 -7522 -4200 -817   
Note: Years shown are the IMF financial years, ending 30 April, i.e. 1980 is year ending 30 April 
1980.  
Source: IMF Annual reports. 
   
    The fund has been extending the repayment terms of its loans through adding new 
facilities which have a longer repayment period than the original 3 to 5 years. The latter 
continues to apply to stand-by arrangements, still the single largest IMF lending window, 
as well as to the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility which is fairly 
important. Repayment of 4-10 years applies to the Extended Financing Facility, the 
second largest, and 5 to 10 years to Structural Adjustment Facility for low income 
countries. But this gradual adaptation to the debt crisis appears to have worked slowly in 
reducing the cash outflow from developing countries. The immediate issue is how to 
avoid that repayment of existing debts to the IMF does not exacerbate the debt problem 
of the present severely indebted debtors. The current developing country debt to the Fund 
is SDRs 25,550 million (US$ 33.8 billion). It would be necessary to examine the part 
owed by severely indebted countries and its repayment schedule, and consider the 
possibility of consolidation of the early and middle maturities into long-term low-interest 
debt.  
    The liquidity situation of developing countries would have been less strained in the 
1980s and would look brighter for the 1990s if issues of SDRs were resumed and 
significant amounts allocated to developing countries. This did not occur as several key 
developed countries did not find it possible to agree to such course of action. This issue, 
of major importance for the future of the international monetary system and for the 
supply of liquidity for developing countries in particular, remains on the international 
agenda.  
   
Supply of development finance  
    Loan commitments of multilateral development finance agencies doubled in the last 
ten years, from US$ 16.6 billion in 1980/81 to US $ 33.9 billion in 1990/91. In real terms 
the increase was probably between one-third and one-half. The World Bank-IDA 
continue to have a commanding position, although growth has been fastest in the African 
and Asian Development Bank Groups in recent years (Table VII).  
    Disbursements, i.e. the actual flow of funds, have increased faster than commitments, 
perhaps as a result of deliberate measures to increase the share of fast-disbursing non-
project loans in total lending so as to alleviate the cash shortage in debtor countries 
during the debt crisis. But the reverse flow, amortization and interest on existing debt, has 
been increasing at an even faster rate, leading to a decline in net transfer (Table VIII).  
    Against disbursements of US$ 23.1 billion in 1990/91, the reverse flow amounted to 
US $ 22.5 billion, thus resulting in a net transfer to debtor countries of only US $ 0.6 
billion. Disbursements vary greatly from year to year. The average for the last four years (1987/88-1990/91) works out at US$ 1.1 billion. This is only one-fifth of the preceding 
four-year average of US $ 5.1 billion. The peak transfer, above US $ 6 billion per year, 
took place in 1983/84 and 1984/85. It is crucial that a large and growing net transfer from 
multilateral development finance agencies be maintained. An urgent consultation with 
management of these agencies is needed concerning factors at work determining net 
transfer, a range of realistic projections which can be made, and the policy options for 
increasing net transfer. IMF management should be invited to attend also.  
Table VII. Loan Commitments of Multilateral Development Finance Agencies, 1980/81-1990/91 
(in billions of US $) 
   
  1980/81 1981/82 1982/831983/841984/851985/861986/871987/881988/89 1989/90 1990/91
World Bank 
and IDA  12,291  13,016  4,479  15,522 14,384 16,319 17,674 19,221 21,367  20,702  22,685








579  636  766  899  897  1,154 1,640 2,140  2,077  2,842  3,281
Total  16,615  17,823  19,673  21,359 21,082 22,346 24,356 26,184 28,289  29,842  33,851
   
Note: 1980/81 (July 1-June 30) for the World Bank and IDA; calendar year 1990 for other 
agencies. The same periodization applies to all years.  
Source: Annual reports of the agencies. 
   
Table VIII. Disbursements, Repayments, Interest Payments and Net Transfers of Multilateral 
Development Finance Agencies, 1980/81-1990/91 
(in billions of US $) 
   
   
  1980/81 1981/82 1982/831983/841984/851985/861986/871987/881988/89 1989/90 1990/91
(1) 
Disbursements  9,172  10,802  12,151 14,124 14,801 15,302 18,432 19,129 20,501  23,991  23,113
(2) 
Repayments  2,042  2,386  2,843  3,438 3,925 4,903 7,020 9,897 11,296  10,491  11,760
(3) Net capital 
inflow (1-2)   7,130  8,416  9,308  10,686 10,876 10,399 11,412 9,232 8,755  13,500  11,347
(4) Income 




4,449  5,341  5,718  6,631 6,243 4,308 3,324 66  -411  4,234  553 
Note and sources: See Table VII, please.  
Conditionality  
    International financial institutions, particularly the IMF, are identified with conditionality, and 
particularly when providing finance for adjustment. A key facet of the social and economic problem during adjustment is the real wage, especially in urban area. Adjustment liberalizes 
interest rates and product prices: it thus increases incomes of owners of capital and, in the case of 
independent producers having saleable surpluses (e.g. in agriculture), their incomes as well. By the 
same token it reduces real wages, at least for as long as total output falls or remains stagnant. In 
contrast to owners of capital, labour cannot move across national borders or can do so only to a 
limited degree; therefore it must accept a wage reduction until it is bearable, and at that point riots 
and bloodshed may hit the street. International development banks in the main have managed to 
avoid getting involved in such disastrous events. IMF has not. The general point was made by Dr. 
Paul Fabra, the first winner of the Jacques Rueff prize on the role of money in the economy:  
"It is illegitimate to see in the wage, and particularly in the wage of the poorest, a variable 
on which one can act at will in `adjustment' programmes. At the end of the 18th century 
and the dawn of the 19th, the founders of political economy recognized this and 
considered the wage as a datum prescribed by the mores of the society at any given time. 
In other words, the workers' standard of living, particularly when it is low, is not a thing 
one can play with. The Monetary Fund, too much influenced by neo-liberal economists, 
for whom wage is a price like any other, would be well advised to be a little more 
`Smithian' and a little more `Ricardian', and a little less `Friedmanite', in this matter." 22 
   
    The President of Ecuador has recently set out the differences in programmes of adjustment as 
they affect income distribution, responding to a question as to whether he thinks that his gradual 
economic reform, as opposed to a short, sharp shock, is the best option for the Ecudorean people:  
"There are two options in the measures we have to take to confront the economic crisis in 
our country. One, shock measures; two, gradual measures. We have rejected as socially 
unjust the first because the measures have a very severe impact on the poor levels of the 
population: unemployment, repressed wages, sharp price rises for gasoline and public 
services, and other similar measures that seriously affect the less fortunate. The second 
option is gradual measures that progressively produce changes and modifications and 
allow us to confront the economic crisis with, comparatively speaking, consequences that 
are less grave than in other Latin American countries. Brusque measures seriously affect 
small businesses, the middle-level companies, the micro-enterprises and people of low 
income while they favour large companies." 23 
   
    There have been new developments in the theory and practice of conditionality in recent years. 
In the theory of conditionality, the Japanese officials have raised serious questions concerning the 
appropriateness of import liberalization as a major element of adjustment in developing countries, 
argued in favour of subsidized interest rates for priority projects, and, more generally, suggested a 
considerable role of the government in promoting specific economic activities and development 
generally -- positions considerably removed from the dominant donor view of conditionality so 
far. Also in the theory of conditionality, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq and professor Paul Streeten, working 
within UNDP, have proposed introduction of "social conditionality of aid", consisting of measures 
focused on human and social development; this conditionality would be additional, and possibly 
superior to, the present conditionality of international financial institutions, which is focused 
mainly on monetary, fiscal, exchange rate and trade policies.  
    In the practice of conditionality, there has occurred a major emphasis by donors on privatization 
and, most recently, on internal political practices in borrowing countries. This emphasis has raised 
issues of social and political organization and policies which did not exist before. In addition, and 
cutting across both conditionality theory and policy, the issue of "shock" vs. gradual approaches to 
stabilization and adjustment has become acute, particularly stimulated by the events in Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR.  
   E. INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE DEBT PROBLEM  
   
   
    Total external debt of developing countries was estimated at US $ 1,341 million at the end of 
1990, compared to US $ 639 billion at the end of 1980. Of the present debt, 57 percent is owed by 
severely indebted countries, low income and middle income, in World Bank classification. 24 
Most of the increase in debt was an increase in real terms, as commodity export prices of 
developing countries, oil and non-oil, fell both in money (current dollars) and in real terms 
(constant dollars); while prices of their manufactured exports rose negligibly (12%) in current 
dollars and fell in real terms. The debt situation continues very difficult in many African countries, 
and their debts continue to grow. Stabilization of debt has been achieved in most of Latin 
American countries, but the creditors continue to report debt servicing problems in the forms of 
accumulation of arrears in many cases.  
Africa  
    Sub-Saharan Africa's debt of about US $ 150 billion is equivalent to more than 100% of its 
GDP, compared to less than 50% in Latin America. The weight of Africa's debt burden is 
exacerbated by its lower per capita income, and its debt servicing is made more difficult than 
elsewhere due to its heavy dependence on primary product exports. Sub-Saharan African countries 
are now paying less than one half of the scheduled debt service (about 40%). The incidence of 
arrears falls severely on bilateral official creditor governments and their agencies in developed 
countries: they received only 20 percent of the debt service due to them in 1989. Multilateral 
official agencies received a preferred treatment (86% paid). Private creditors were paid almost 
one-third. However, short-term trade credits are fully serviced by most borrowers even when they 
are accumulating arrears on long-term debt to the same creditors.  
    The major traditional form of debt reorganization -- debt rescheduling on conventional terms -- 
has proved ineffective. It has led to "steady accumulation of debt to bilateral creditor governments, 
resulting from repeated debt reschedulings and the resulting capitalization of interest, including 
arrears."25 The other form, debt forgiveness by official creditors, adopted at the Group of 7 
meeting in Toronto in 1988, also proved of limited significance. "Nine donor countries in the 
OECD have so far announced plans to cancel or convert bilateral loans owed by various low-
income countries into grants. The total amount of debt forgiven or converted up to the end of 1989 
is almost US $ 6 billion."26 This reduction represents less than 10 percent of this class of debt 
aggregating US $ 64 billion; it compares with the reduction of 50 percent or more of Poland's 
official bilateral debt.  
    The World Bank, which as a matter of policy has neither rescheduled its loans nor scaled them 
down so far, has individual country programmes of accelerating the quickly disbursing loans to 
Africa, so as to assure that there will be no net financial transfer to the Bank/IDA from severely 
indebted African countries. As a result, net transfers from the World Bank/IDA amounted to US $ 
1 billion annually on the average during the latter half of the 1980s. 27 This does not mean, 
however, that each country individually obtained resources net from the Bank/IDA in these years. 
Such important debtors as Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria were transferring resources net during 1987-
89, and also, so did such important borrowers as Zimbabwe and Mauritius. IMF has been 
withdrawing resources from Sub-Saharan Africa for several years. Adverse net financial transfers 
averaged US $ 0.7 billion per year in the five years 1986-90, and the debt outstanding to the Funds 
was US $ 6.4 billion at the end of 1990. Withdrawal of resources has occurred despite the 
introduction by the Fund of special facilities on concessional terms (SAF - Structural Adjustment 
Facility and ESAF-Extended Structural Adjustment Facility).28  
    No substantial remedy has yet been applied to Sub-Sahara's debt owed to private banks and 
other private parties. The proposal of the African Development Bank, prepared with the advice of Warburgs, the British investment bank, three years ago, which envisaged the retirement of these 
debts through a sinking fund on favourable terms, was not implemented. The World Bank 
established in 1989 the "IDA Debt Reduction Facility" which is to provide grants up to US $ 10 
million per country to the poor countries with adjustment programmes to buy back or exchange 
commercial bank debt at a discount. Sixteen African countries have requested the use of this 
facility, with an aggregate debt to banks of about US $ 2 billion. Niger and Mozambique have 
been the only beneficiaries until 30 June 1991, with the additional assistance for debt purchasing 
given by France, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands. The prices were 18% and 10% 
respectively, of face value. Much of the delay in drawing on the resources of this facility is due to 
the reluctance of banke to participate, in part to avoid setting precedents for other debtor countries 
where their exposure is larger. 29 Furthermore, this facility cannot be used to help countries such 
as Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, major debtors to private banks and suppliers in Africa, first because 
they are not classified as IDA-only (very poor), and secondly, they need much more than US $ 10 
million to buy back any significant portion of their commercial debt: Nigeria's debt to private 
creditors amounted to US $ 16.8 billion at the end of 1989 and that of Cote d'Ivoire at least US $ 4 
billion.  
    The conclusion follows that, while some efforts have been imaginative and generous, the 
overall debt strategy has been weak, uncoordinated and of limited effectiveness. African debt 
continued to grow at 10 percent per year as the economies of many African countries were 
weakening.  
    On 7 September 1990, the Netherlands Development Minister of Jan Pronk proposed that 
creditor countries collectively extend a complete forgiveness of bilateral official debt to the 
poorest developing countries facing severe debt problems. Forgiveness should be conditional on 
the debtor countries implementing sound economic policies. On 20 September, Mr. Major, then 
U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed changes in the present "Toronto" terms for official 
debt and debt service reduction of the poorest countries, which call for a cancellation of two-thirds 
of the stock of eligible debt and a rescheduling of the remainder over twenty-five years with five 
years of grace; interest due during the first five years after rescheduling could be capitalized; later 
payments could be graduated and related to the debtor's ability to pay ("Trinidad proposal"). Prior 
to the London meeting of the Group of 7 in July 1991 it was believed that the "Trinidad proposal" 
would be adopted. However, it appears that no decision was made: it seems that the London 
meeting concentrated on the issue of possible assistance to the USSR and ended up not deciding 
either on Africa's debt or on Russian help. At the United Nations General Assembly, on 15 
September 1991, "wealthy nations promised to help reduce Africa's staggering debt and pledged 
more foreign aid, but declined to commit themselves to specific targets." 30  
Table IX. Composition of Debt Service Paid by Sub-Saharan Africa, by Creditor Source, 
1990 (a) % Shares  
   
Creditor source  1990 
Medium and long-term  86.0 
Official  55.1 
Multilateral (b)   32.5 
World Bank  14.8 
IMF  10.2 
Others  7.7 
Bilateral  22.6 
Paris club  15.1 
Arab  2.6 
CMEA  2.0 
Others  2.9 Private  30.9 
Total commercial banks  22.9 
Suppliers and others  8.1 
Short-term  14.0 
Total external debt  100.0 
   
Notes: (a) Preliminary, (b) Includes IMF.  
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, op.cit., page 91  
   
    If the Pronk-Major proposals were adopted, they would provide cash relief to those poorest 
debtors which are still servicing their bilateral official debts, and would regularize the situation of 
those debtors which are not paying now. However, not all problems would be resolved by these 
proposals. Paid debt service on official bilateral debt now accounts for only 23 percent of total 
debt service of Sub-Saharan Africa, and within this the Paris club creditors account for only 15 
percent. (The remaining 8 percent is owed to governments of Arab and CMEA countries, and to 
"others.") In contrast, debt service paid to multilateral institutions accounts for 33% of total debt 
service (1990), having risen from a 15% share in 1980. It follows that alleviation of the position of 
Sub-Saharan debtors and the solution of the Sub-Saharan debt problem are very difficult to 
envisage without new actions of these institutions. With respect to private creditors which still 
absorb as much as 31 percent of Sub-Saharan debt service (and 45 percent if service on short-term 
debt is included, see Table IX), the World Bank makes the following suggestion:  
"Commercial banks also must expect to share debt relief burden. If comprehensive 
settlements through discounted purchases are blocked, debtor countries may want to use 
concessional aid available for this purpose to buy out those creditors willing to settle. The 
resolution of the bond crisis of the 1930s followed that pattern: debtor countries 
repurchased bonds at a deep discount on the secondary market, followed, often after 
many years, by settlements at less than par with the remaining bond holders."31 
   
    But in order to buy their debts in the secondary market, debtor countries need funds. Some, 
perhaps most, aid funds are not available for his purpose; and those that are need to be diverted 
from other uses in meeting the frequently vital current expenditures and essential investment 
needs. Debtor countries normally need additional resources to be able to buy their debts, even at a 
deep discount. Strapped for cash, they need to borrow. Again the main prospective lenders are 
international financial institutions, from their existing resources or from additional resources they 
might be able to mobilize; unless a special institution for repurchase of Sub-Saharan Africa's debts 
is created, which will need resources also.  
   
Severely indebted middle income countries  
    The statistical debt position of twenty severely indebted middle income countries has improved 
on the average since the peak of their debt crisis in the mid-1980s. As their debt outstanding has 
stabilized and their exports have increased, the ratio of debt to exports has declined; and this 
factor, and the fall in the dollar interest rates in 1991, have brought down the proportion of their 
exports absorbed by debt service also. However, these ratios are still at a level which the UN Latin 
American experts believe the capital market would consider too high.32 "The fall in accrued 
interest on the debt, coupled with the expected slight rise in the region's export earnings, will mean 
that Latin America's (excluding Panama) interest payments/export ratio should decline to 23%, 
from the 25% recorded last year. This would be the fifth consecutive year that the coefficient has 
fallen and would bring it down to a level which is nearly half of the peak of 41% recorded in 1982. 
Nevertheless, the region's interest/export ratio remains very troublesome and above the 20% that is often considered a threshold for financial crisis. As for the relation between the region's debt and 
exports, the similar rates of growth expected for these two variables will mean that the coefficient 
should be similar to last year's 285%. While this ratio is well below the peak level of 416% 
registered in 1986, it still remains considerably above the 200% which is often used as a ceiling 
for creditworthiness."33  
    A factor in stabilizing the debt level has been the debt reduction programme with respect to 
commercial bank loans, carried out with the assistance of the World Bank, IMF and Japan (Brady 
plan). Five countries have benefited from this programme: Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, 
Uruguay and the Philippines. The net effect of these operations is not clear-cut, in the view of UN 
ECLAC: "With regard to the Brady plan, its [debt] contractionary impact in 1991 is still uncertain. 
On the one hand, it is still not clear whether negotiations will advance quickly enough in Brazil 
and Argentina to finalize accords this year. 34 On the other, while Brady accords have reduced the 
present value of the debt owed to banks, they have also often generated enough new debt-related 
collateral requirements and refinancing to result in little or no reduction in overall gross external 
obligations." In the 1991 assessment of the World Bank, "the results have been very positive for 
Mexico, in terms of both growth and improved financial conditions, through return of flight 
capital, increased foreign direct investment, and access to external capital, albeit at higher 
spreads... In the case of other countries, the impact of the Brady-initiative operations is not yet 
clear."35  
    When this initiative was launched, in March 1989, it was estimated that there would be 39 
beneficiaries over three years. It is now clear that implementation will be very much smaller. In its 
progress report of March 1991, the World Bank states: "Certain challenges to the program remain. 
Most importantly, arrears have become both larger and more widespread. This makes it more 
difficult to reach further agreements, and it increases the requirement for the Bank to exercise 
careful judgment when providing support for debt and debt service reduction operations."36 In 
mid-1991, accumulations of interest arrears were still running in the majority of Latin American 
countries, and the UN Latin American experts estimated the end-1991 arrears at about US $ 25 
billion.37 For developing countries as a whole, arrears on debts both to private and official 
creditors, and including both interest and principal, amounted to US $ 112 billion at the end of 
1990, compared to 69 billion at end-1989 and 40 billion at end-1988, according to World Bank 
data (World Debt Tables 1991-92, page 15).  
    Accumulation of arrears at the time of improvement of the statistical debt position shows the 
limitation of the latter in portraying the debt problem. Debt servicing capacity primarily depends 
on whether sufficient income growth takes place so that a surplus can be generated which can be 
used for debt service while simultaneously leaving a margin needed for a satisfactory increase in 
domestic consumption and investment; whether income increments are fairly distributed so that 
social stability is sustained; whether the fiscal system is sufficiently efficient so as to capture the 
needed flow of public savings out of income; whether the balance of payments structure and the 
foreign exchange system permit a smooth transfer of savings abroad; and whether the domestic 
returns on investment are higher than the international rate of interest. While debt ratios are 
important in indicating the initial debt burden position, it is these other relationships and their 
dynamics over time which are determining factors for debt servicing capacity.  
   
Flaws in the analytical framework  
    Two flaws in the analytical framework used in the formulation of international debt policy of 
the 1980s were identified by an international group of experts in June 1990:  
a.  No detailed estimates appear to have been made, on a country-by-country basis, of the 
capital requirements for overcoming the crisis and restoring a satisfactory rate of growth over the medium term; or if such estimates were made, they do not appear to have been 
used in putting forward the past overall debt policies. 
b.  No attempt seems to have been made to examine the prospects for long-term debt 
servicing capacity, on a country-by-country basis, and determine the extent of debt relief 
or of cash-flow rearrangement accordingly.38 
    Several prominent economists have drawn attention to the analytical empty space concerning 
estimates of capital requirements for resumption of economic growth. According to Sidney Dell: 
"The Bank and the Fund have not received a mandate to work out the implications for the debtor 
countries of resuming the growth process which North and South both agree is an indispensable 
objective for growing out of the debt crisis. This in turn means that the capital requirements for 
adjustment with growth in the debtor countries as a whole have not been studied by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, let alone agreed upon by the international community. The rate of growth of 
the debtor countries emerges as a residual, a by-product of the feasible rate of borrowing... The 
figures for debt relieve or debt reduction currently discussed are based more on some kind of 
guess as to political feasibility than on any scientific analysis of the data. In the absence of such an 
investigation, the debt strategy will continue to be an improvised affair in which the solutions 
proposed tend to amount to the minimum steps necessary to keep things going instead of being 
reasonable approximation to growth requirements... The capital exporters obviously have the right 
to take their own positions on the capital to be provided both overall and to individual countries. 
But they should at least be in possession of independently determined facts and analyses."39  
    Concerning the second analytical gap, missing estimates of debt servicing capacity, the Report 
of experts stresses that in the absence of such estimates, the extent of debt relief and cash-flow 
rearrangement is now determined by unequal bargaining between the banks as a group and 
individual debtors in the case of debts to banks: and by decisions of creditor governments in the 
case of official loans.40 A comment on present practice suggests "injection of much-needed 
economics into the negotiations and use of such [analytical derived] estimates as a starting point 
for guided bargaining on the extent and form of debt reduction."41  
   
Proposals for procedural and interim arrangements  
    In order to remedy this situation, one of the recommendations of the 1990 Report called for the 
establishment of independent teams of experts for each debtor country and wants them, headed by 
a prominent person in finance, economics or political life, to work out proposals for restoration of 
economic growth, suitable debt reorganization, and domestic measures to support them. These 
teams would draw on all sources of information and advice: from debtors, bilateral official 
creditors, creditor banks and international financial and development institutions. The 
responsibility for the proposals would rest with the teams.42 It would be up to the debtors and the 
creditors whether to accept the proposals. Past successful precedents for this procedure are the 
German and Indonesian debt settlements of 1953 and 1970, respectively; both were prepared and 
negotiated by a well known German banker, Hermann Abs. The German settlement reduced its 
obligations by some 74%. Reduction in Indonesia is quoted at 57%, but it is not clear whether this 
estimate includes all forms of debt relief.43 The aim of the Indonesian settlement was to restore 
Indonesia to international creditworthiness with access to normal credit facilities, to make it 
eligible for loans from the international financial institutions and from private sources, to restore 
the country as an important partner in world trade with a view to reducing dependence on foreign 
aid, and "to give the Indonesian government freedom and independence in its decisions on 
fundamental economic questions."44  
    In view of the possible extra demand in financial markets resulting from requirements of 
Eastern Europe, and the time it would take to prepare and agree on a lasting solution of the debt 
and resource flow problems, the Report of experts suggested that consideration be given to an 
interim bridging arrangement which would include postponement of amortization and fractional payments of interest in foreign exchange, in local currency of the debtor, and through 
capitalization into new loans. Such an interim arrangement would provide relief to debtors 
immediately, without prejudging the final outcome. The interim arrangement would apply to both 
private and official loans. The danger of rapid accumulation of debt through interest capitalization 
would be reduced as it would affect only a fraction of interest, and it would be eliminated if a 
concessional rate of interest could be agreed. The size of the fractions would depend on the 
economic position of the debtor country. The lowest income countries would be required to make 
the lowest payment in foreign exchange. The scheme would not apply to concessionary debts and 
to trade credits. Also exempted would be those creditors whose disbursements exceed a country's 
debt service. Appropriate adjustments would be made in cases of partial coverage of debt service 
by disbursements.45  
F. FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT  
Geographic distribution of foreign direct investment  
    In the estimate of the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate, foreign direct 
investment in developing countries reached a peak in 1990, double the low point of the 1980s, 
recorded in 1983.46 From the previous peak, in 1981, the increase in U.S. dollar terms was 43 
percent; in real terms, there probably was no increase. The World Bank series shows an increase in 
U.S. dollar terms of 69 percent from peak to peak; this is probably no more than one-fifth in real 
terms over 9 years.47 This is a modest advance, but it is better than what happened to international 
private lending.  
    Table X shows a declining share of developing countries in total inflow of foreign direct 
investment, from 25% in 1980/84 to 17% in 1988-89. In the judgment of the UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations, "although current trends indicate a strengthening of the position of 
certain developing countries and regions, especially in light of the emerging regional core network 
strategies of transnational corporations, it is unlikely that the declining share of world-wide 
foreign-direct-investment flows to developing countries will be reversed in the near future, despite 
efforts by nearly all these countries to open up their economies to foreign direct investment and 
liberalize their policy regimes."48  
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Part II: Commodity Problem, Poor Countries and Poor People  
A. INTRODUCTION  
    International commodity markets represents a major outlet for developing country total 
sales. Integration into the world economy of these countries, and frequently their growth 
process, normally start with the development of primary products for which markets are 
abroad, as it is the foreign richer countries which have sufficient purchasing power, and 
also, there are those abroad which experience deficiencies of particular resources and 
must meet them through imports. Since 1950, many developing countries have gone 
through a significant industrialization drive, and since 1970 a limited but growing 
number have succeeded in developing considerable and rising exports of manufactures 
for the world market. Nonetheless, the majority of developing countries have remained 
dependent on primary products for welfare and growth: African countries depend on 
primary products to an overwhelming 80 to 90% of their total exports, these products 
account for more than 65% of Latin American exports, and similar dependency is 
encountered in many other developing countries.  
    Commodity markets are among the most volatile of markets; and poor countries suffer 
from this volatility most, first because of their heavy reliance on these markets, and 
secondly, because they are less able, due to shortage of finance and poverty, to adapt their 
sales to changes in demand and to vicissitudes of prices so as to maximize revenue and 
minimize losses. Furthermore, long-term demand for primary products expands less fast 
than the demand for manufactures and services, while supply shows a persistent tendency 
to over-production because of shortage of alternative employment opportunities in 
developing countries and in primary production (agriculture) generally, and because of 
insufficiency of skills for diversified production. Hence there has been a persistent 
tendency for prices of most primary products to fall in relation to prices of most 
manufactures, and this adverse movement in the terms of trade was one of the key 
unfavourable features with which developing countries had to cope both in the inter-war 
period and since 1950.  
    Downward fluctuation and adverse trend are fully at work since 1989, and the 
developing world is now experiencing another collapse of commodity prices, which has 
brought them down, in real terms, to the lowest level since 1950, and, according to The 
Economist and World Bank analysts, over the last 100-150 years. The current situation in 
commodity prices and finance is discussed in section B. This is followed by an 
assessment of short and medium-term fluctuations (section C), and long-run trends 
(section D). The position of developing countries as sellers and buyers is discussed in 
section E, and the situation in their plantations, farms and mines -- the human factor, 
wages -- in section F. Commodity price stabilization, alternatives to it, past experience 
with it, and the ways in which it can be approached in the future are reviewed in section 
G.  
   B. COMMODITY SLUMP 1990-91  
Prices  
    Between early 1989 and mid 1991, export commodity prices of developing countries 
fell about 20%, according to UNCTAD, World Bank and IMF indices, a speed of decline 
only slightly lower than during the slump in 1980-82, which triggered the international 
debt crisis and ushered "the decade lost for development." The Economist's index shows 
a decline of about 30% between 1988 and 1991.49 In any case, prices of primary 
products in real terms are very much lower now than they were in the early 1980s, and 
therefore any additional fall is felt with ever greater hardship.  
   
 
Table I. Weighted index of commodity prices, 33 products (a)  
(excluding energy, constant US dollars, 1979-81 = 100)  
1980-91 
1980  104.8  1986  69.3 
1981  90.9  1987  63.4 
1982  82.6  1988  71.1 
1983  89.1  1989  70.3 
1984  92.3  1990  62.1 
1985  81.3  1991  57.0 (b)  
Notes: (a) Weighted by 1979-81 developing countries' export values; (b) First half; preliminary. 
For the entire 1991, the index is 58.2. The World Bank projection for 1992 is 56.1.  
Sources: World Bank, Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets, June 1991: and Quarterly Review of CM, April 1992. 
    Most of the key products are affected by the present commodity depression. 
"Aluminium prices are probably at an all-time low in real terms"; 50 tin prices in August 
1991 were at a level "at which most of the world's tin mining and smelting operations are 
loss-makers";51 "our dollar metals index has fallen 27% over the past year and it is now 
more than 50% below its June 1988 peak";52 "combined stocks of base metals on the 
London Metal Exchange have risen to an all-time high";53 "Malaysian rubber output is at 
the lowest level for 20 years";54 the price of coffee in real terms is lower than at any time 
since 1950;55 cocoa is undergoing a major depression; the real price of jute since 1986 is 
a fraction of the historical level;56 and sugar at 8.8 U.S. cents per pound57 is once again 
"cheaper than the sand scooped up from the beaches", in the phrase of the Australian 
Trade Minister during another sugar crisis, in the 1960s. Only tropical timber seems to 
have gone up in price.  
   
Incomes  
    In Malaysia, one of the most efficient commodity producers, rubber growers' net 
monthly income dropped 33% from 1988 to 1990; oil palm farmers were even worse off, 
with incomes falling 50 percent.58 "Planters testify to how the peaks in the markets' 
cycles are becoming shorter-lived and the troughs ever longer.  It used to be two years, sometimes three', according to one producer.  Now it is seven or eight, with a brief year 
in-between.' Malaysia's plantation industry is entering its twilight years."59 Even 
Australia's rural sector "is facing its worst financial crisis for a century", according to the 
president of the National Farmers Federation. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics forecasts that average prices received by farmers would fall by five 
percent in 1991, following a decline of 13 percent in 1990 Net farm cash incomes would 
fall by 24 percent following 35 percent in the last financial year. "The rural sector has 
been hit by weal prices for a range of commodities, including sugar, dairy products, and 
beef. However, the biggest problems have been caused by competition from subsidized 
wheat exports an the collapse of the wool market because of over-production and falling 
demand."60  
    Over vast areas of Africa, Latin America and partly Asia, it is the collapse of the coffee 
and cocoa markets which have caused enormous damage. Coffee export earnings have 
been cut in half, with a loss estimated at US $ 4 to 7 billion per year. 61 Coffee is the 
second largest primary export of developing countries after petroleum; and the 
suspension of the operating provisions of the international coffee agreement in 1989 has 
affected some of the poorest developing countries and regions with large populations. An 
excessive investment in cocoa growing, partly financed from external sources and 
stimulated by currency devaluations, ended in the late 1980s, when the price was driven 
to below US$ 1,000 per ton, compared to an average of more than US $ 2,000 in 1980-
87. (At its peak, in 1977, the price was US$ 5,467). Parts of West Africa have been 
devastated by the cocoa crisis. Similar economic circumstances in the mid-1960s led to 
political upheavals in the region, whose effects are still partly felt.  
   
Factors at work  
    The slow-down in the world economy, with recessionary tendencies in some important 
parts, and the previous excessive investment in some primary products, have been the 
dominant factors in causing the downturn. But changes in the USSR have affected 
commodity markets also, in two directions. First, increased Soviet demand, actual or 
expected, for foodstuffs, has strengthened or prevented the weakening of the grains and 
meat markets. Secondly, increased Soviet sales of metals -- aluminium, nickel, copper, 
platinum and minor metals -- have contributed to the weakness of the metal market 
during the last two years. These increased sales, induced by the shortage of foreign 
exchange in the USSR, and therefore the need to sell even at falling prices, have attracted 
much attention. It is not clear to what extent they can be sustained: this will depend 
primarily on the state of mining equipment within the former USSR. But it is likely that 
the pressure to sell will be present for some time, in view of the independence of the 
states and a growing autonomy of the producers and foreign trade organizations, all with 
their needs for foreign exchange, unless commodity arrangements can be made with other 
producers providing for orderly marketing.  
   
Withdrawal of commodity finance      In February 1991, it was reported from London that "international banks, already 
shaken by mounting bad debts in property, industry and the Third World, are reeling 
again, this time from multi-million dollar losses on commodity lending. Some banks, 
aghast at the growing pool of red ink, are expected to quit commodity financing 
altogether, while others are set to charge higher fees to all but top-notch customers... The 
recent failure of one of Britain's oldest commodity houses, Woodhouse Drake and Carey, 
has sent shock waves through banking boardrooms. The 223-year-old trading firm 
collapsed with debts of US $ 150-200 million. More generally, plunging raw materials 
prices, squeezed commissions, and soaring costs have caused a flurry of financial 
problems in world commodity houses. As a result, one bank has already decided to quit 
commodity lending and others are expected to follow, bankers say. This follows a steady 
exodus of U.S. banks from commodity financing in recent years."62  
    In March 1991, it was reported from Paris that Sucres et Denrees, the leading French 
commodity trader with a heavy involvement in world trade in cocoa, coffee, rice, sugar 
and oil, was getting a large loan from French banks to cover losses in its trading 
activities, on condition that in the future "it will embark on fewer big trades and will put 
more emphasis on less risky downstream activities" (mainly food processing).63 This 
firm had bought 400,000 tons of cocoa from Ivory Coast or one-fourth of the world crop, 
in 1988, and 10% of Iran's entire oil output in 1989.  
    In April 1991, it was reported from London that Philip and Lion, one of the last 
privately-owned international metal-trading groups, ceased trading and would seek 
voluntary liquidation, because of extreme liquidity shortage. The company trading 
activities were mainly in non-ferrous metals, both primary and scarp. "Metal traders 
suggested that there were some signs that many banks were now unwilling to keep a high 
financial exposure in volatile commodity markets. The physical merchanting business 
had contracted in recent years and this trend was likely to continue, traders added. Other 
merchants were believed to be in difficulties."64  
    These instances of traders and banks withdrawing from commodity finance because of 
increased risks associated with price falls and resulting losses on inventory make the 
position of commodity producers even more vulnerable than so far: as the pool of funds 
available to finance stocks (inventories) is being reduced, the likelihood of deep price 
falls would be increasing. The need for public stocks to fill the gap therefore increases 
also.  
   
C. PRICE FLUCTUATIONS  
Magnitude and increase over time  
    Chart I below shows the range of price instability indices for 34 commodities in the 
1980s. Differences in instability among commodities are wide: the index for the least 
stable (sugar) is more than eleven times that for the most stable (oranges).      Table II below follows the individual commodity instability indices over time, through 
four successive decades from the 1950s to the 1980s, for fourteen agricultural 
commodities. "For bananas, coconut oil, groundnut oil, and palm oil, price instability 
appears to have increased unambiguously sine the 1960s, and for coffee, copra, cotton, 
maize, tea and wheat, price instability was higher in the 1970s an 1980s than it was in the 
1950s and 1960s. For cocoa, rice, rubber and sugar, evidence is mixed, but regression of 
ten-year moving coefficients of variation shows that the trend of instability has been 
positive for all these crops except cotton and rubber."65 For both cotton and rubber, the 
price trend was consistently downward in real terms in 1950-1990, however, so their 
producers did not get much comfort from relatively low price variability around generally 
falling movement.  
   
 
Chart I. - not yet available 
 




    Fluctuations result from a number of causes, which, while largely independent from 
each other, frequently coincide. When they do, fluctuations can take on catastrophic 
dimensions.  
    First, there is the influence of cyclical income fluctuations in consuming countries, 
corresponding to the broad movement of the general business cycle. "For most 
commodities, economic activity in the industrial countries continues to be an important -- 
often the most important -- determinant... Ups and downs in industrial country production 
have important consequences for commodity exporters, particularly exporters of metals 
and agricultural raw materials." 66 But they affect exporters of foodstuffs also as changes 
in industrial country production cause changes in their employment and consumer 
incomes.  
    Secondly, there are short-period fluctuations which are due primarily to good or poor 
harvests caused by variations in weather conditions. In some commodities there is also a 
tendency towards a two-year production cycle, a year of good yield followed by a year of 
poor yield, with corresponding variations in prices in the opposite direction.  
    Thirdly, price fluctuations resulting from either the demand or supply shifts can be 
accentuated by speculative trade -- when one buys things one does not need and sells 
things one does not have, in the phrase of the Nobel Prize winner professor Maurice Allais. The conventional view holds that speculation is normally of a price stabilizing 
nature; what it forgets is that the stabilizing function -- buy the commodity when the 
price is low as well when the price is high -- frequently takes place only after the price 
has fallen sufficiently low (or risen sufficiently high); the term "sufficiently" reflecting 
the judgment of the market of the likely bottom and the likely peak of the price. In 
practice, and based on past experience, commodity speculators frequently expect the 
price, when it starts falling, to fall a long way; consequently, once the decline starts, they 
sell; consequently the price decline accelerates. Since much of commodity speculation is 
carried on borrowed funds against collateral of commodity contracts, the price fall 
reduces the value of the collateral; and as this reduction takes place, the lenders call their 
loans. If chances of price improvement in the near future are judged limited, commodity 
speculators prefer to lose their deposit (cash margin) rather than put up more collateral; 
they get sold out by the lenders, and the price falls further, perhaps in successive waves 
as lower and lower commodity contract prices and associated collateral values are 
reached. Brokerage houses advise selling once the decline starts:  
"If you as a speculator have a position at a time when an unfavourable major trend 
develops, you may postpone liquidating your position until you have a substantial loss. It 
is easy to defer taking a loss in the hope that prices will recover and the position can be 
liquidated without any loss at all. But once started, commodity prices frequently move in 
one direction for some time. If you do not liquidate promptly at a small loss you may be 
forced to take a sizeable loss"67 
    Keynes put the matter in a more general fashion. When a surplus of a product 
develops, the costs of storage and interest are involved, and these costs -- negative return, 
he called them -- must be absorbed. In the process, great damage can be inflicted to 
income, output and investment. As Keynes put it:  
"The competitive system abhors the existence of stocks, with as strong a refle as nature 
abhors a vacuum, because stocks yield a negative return in themselves. It is ready without 
remorse to tear the structure of output to pieces rather than admit them, and in the effort 
to rid itself of them."68 
    This was the theoretical basis for Keynes' long efforts to get commodity stabilization, 
organized and financed by public authorities, politically accepted, which carried the idea 
through almost to Bretton Woods, but fell short of the objective mainly because of 
opposition of vested interests and perhaps partly due to misunderstandings.  
    The opposite to cumulative price declines in case of surpluses is the situation of 
cumulative price increases in case of shortages, again induced by the possibility of 
destabilizing behaviour of privately-held stocks. When prices are on the upswing, the 
demand for private stocks may increase as prices increase, because the latter are expected 
to increase even further.  
    A reasonable price stability under circumstances of these destabilizing movements of 
private stocks calls for, and justifies, operation of publicly-held stocks, under 
international control or under export control of national authorities, or a combination of 
both.  
   Commodity cycles in tree crops  
    Commodity cycles in tree crops, characterized by alternating phases of high prices, low 
prices and price recovery, are engendered partly by the fundamental features of the 
industry and partly by a special constellation of demand and supply price elasticities. 
Coffee is an outstanding case. It is a tree crop which requires a fairly long gestation 
period: coffee trees begin to bear within three to five years after planting and come into 
full bearing only about 7-10 years after planting. The short-run response of supply to an 
increase in price is weak: high prices lead to some increase in current yields, by more 
expenditure on pruning, weeding, spraying and fertilizer. Their main effect, however, is 
on new investment in coffee production (purchase and preparation of land, planting, 
buildings), i.e. the major thrust is on long-run supply. Investment responds sharply to 
high and rising prices. However, once a substantial number of young trees begin to come 
into production, the process reverses itself. The stream of new supplies come to the 
market and causes a very heavy pressure on prices, as demand responds very weekly to 
price changes; and the short-run response of supply is also low since variable costs 
(wages) are relatively low, while shifts into alternatives require cash outflow for new 
investment. Prices have to fall to a very low level to affect current output. However, 
depressed prices do affect investment activity in coffee production. New investment 
ceases, while old trees go out of production. There is a painful readjustment which may 
last almost two decades, until consumption catches again with output, leads to a new 
shortage and a new cycle. And intertwined with this multi-year cycles are purely short-
term fluctuations. 69  
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    The multi-year cycle, and the associated waste of resources and human misery, can be 
overcome to a substantial degree through public (government) restraint on new 
investment during the upswing phase and through systematic diversification and 
productivity improvements throughout the cycle at a regular pace.  
   
Effects on exporting countries  
    Some academic writings have questioned whether commodity fluctuations have a 
negative effect on exporting countries.70 An effective response has been provided by a close observer, Dr. D. C. Rao, Director of the International Economics Department of the 
World Bank:  
"As has been made painfully obvious during the 1980s, the developing countries face 
great difficulties in raising external finance and in servicing their external debts, due in 
large part to the sharp fluctuations in the prices received from their primary commodity 
exports. Their terms of trade are also very susceptible to import price shocks, especially 
for the most important primary product import for most of them -- petroleum.  
In turn, the terms-of-trade shocks from primary commodity price fluctuations are a major 
problem for the management of firms and, probably most important, for the macro-
management of the developing countries themselves. It is probably fair to say that the 
effort that has had to be devoted to macro management of these economies in the wake of 
such shocks has detracted seriously from the effort that would have otherwise been given 
to getting on with the process of development."71 
    At the sectoral level, fluctuations have an adverse effect on investment in, and working 
of, the mining industry. During the recovery of the metals market in 1986-88, major 
supply disruptions occurred in Peru (copper, lead and zinc), Papua-New-Guinea, Zambia, 
Chile and Zaire (copper). "It has been most unfortunate that developing country 
producers have been unable to take full advantage of the metals price boom. but the low 
prices of 1982-85 period made it difficult for them to import material and to maintain 
their production capacity. So that when the demand for metals increased, they were 
unable to respond. In fact, the lack of facility maintenance led to breakdowns in 
production. The high prices also led to a sharp increase in strikes as labour attempted to 
recover the losses in real wages, suffered during the period of low prices." 72 In contrast, 
large rich companies in developed countries managed to restructure and cut costs in the 
first half of the 1980s, and therefore were able to reap the full benefits of the demand and 
price increases later on.73 In tin in Malaysia, it is small, labour-intensive mines which are 
particularly adversely affected by price falls, as they have higher average costs and less 
resources to tide them over the slump.74 Large labour reductions then take place.  
    In coffee, large farms reduce labour force some during the price slump as they cut 
down on pruning and somewhat on picking.75 In cocoa, it is likely that wages will be cut 
first, followed by a reduction of inputs such as fertilizers, insecticides, etc.76 In sugar, 
large companies are likely to maintain their output or even increase it despite price fall, 
because they have written off the capital investment in the sugar mill -- a reaction which 
aggravates further price instability; while small-scale outgrowers generally will switch 
their efforts away from sugar case to other crops more readily.77  
    At the level of public finance, "the effects of price fall can be very important, since for 
many commodity-exporting countries a substantial proportion of government revenue is 
derived from export taxes and taxes on corporations involved in foreign trade. 
Consequently, a large and prolonged fall in export prices is likely to cause an immediate 
budgetary difficulty or even crisis, followed by cuts in spending -- often spending on 
social services (health, education, etc.)."78  
Effects on financial markets in developed countries      Sharp fluctuations in commodity prices have had adverse influences on financial 
markets in developed countries in two directions. First, on the level of overall finances, 
sharp increases in commodity prices have led to the introduction of more restrictive 
domestic monetary policies in industrialized countries, which in turn has led to slow-
downs in their economic activity on several occasions. And conversely, a contraction in 
real export earnings of developing countries following a fall in their export prices, has 
resulted in a reduction of exports to them from industrialized countries. Moreover, a 
prolonged period of depressed commodity prices, as in the 1980s, undermines the ability 
of commodity exporting countries to service their external debts and thus inevitably has 
an impact on the profitability of the private banking sector of the developed countries.79  
    Secondly, on the level of securities markets, in much of the 1980s share markets have 
been heavily influenced by interest rates, while the latter, in turn, have been greatly 
affected by expected movements in commodity prices. The implicit theory has been that 
commodity futures are a fairly reliable indicator of inflationary expectations which 
determine the rate of interest (or at least determine the policies of central banks which 
then influence the rate of interest). The stylized sequence would be: a rise in commodity 
prices causes an increase in inflationary expectations; the latter lead to an increase in 
interest rates and yields to offset the expected loss in value of financial assets due to 
inflation; the counterpart of the interest rate increase is a fall in prices of bonds and other 
fixed-income securities; the fall in bond prices induces a switch of funds from shares to 
bonds, and a corresponding fall in the price of shares (stocks). A report on trading in U.S. 
on 19 May 1988 shows how this works:  
"In a large degree, the behaviors of the Dow Jones industrial stocks average mirrored 
movements in the bond market, which in turn were in line with the Commodity Research 
Bureau index, a key measure of inflation that tracks commodity figures prices in 
Chicago. The CRB index rose sharply in the morning, heightening inflation fears, raising 
yields in the bond market and depressing stock prices as bonds became a more attractive 
alternative to stocks. The index later retreated when soybeans futures weakened, easing 
bond yields and helping the stock market rise.  The funny thing is how the market is so 
tuned to inflation, it turned on the commodity price index, which was turned on and off 
on soybeans' according to one financier.  This shows how graphically the stock market 
has become a commodity business."80 
    According to some financial analysts, prices for commodities and bonds have 
consistently moved in opposite directions, "a pattern which they call the most important 
of all market links. In the most celebrated example, the Commodity Research Bureau 
index surged and bonds began to drop in April 1987, which set the stage for October's 
stock market crash (1987)." 81  
    The reported disruptive impact of commodity price fluctuations on interest rates, and 
via the latter, on share markets raises the question of the need for international 
commodity stabilization from an unexpected angle. The major interest in stabilization so 
far has been that of primary producing developing countries. Consuming countries have 
joined in this quest on rare occasions and mostly for limited periods. Most of them have 
been apprehensive, it would seem, that benefits from international stabilization would primarily occur to the exporters, while the consumers would pay higher prices on the 
average. But if the costs of commodity instability in causing financial destabilization in 
developed countries are factored in, interest of these latter countries in commodity 
stabilization should be expected to increase at some point, as financial destabilization can 
be expected to lead to losses in employment and output, additional to those caused by 
price instability directly.  
   
D. LONG-TERM PRICE TRENDS  
Statistical findings  
    Set forth below are the five-year averages of the price indices in real terms of 33 
commodities exported by developing countries for the period 1948-1990.  
   
 
Table III. Weighted index of commodity prices, 33 products (a)  
(excluding energy, constant US dollars, 1979-81=100 (b)  
1948-90 
1948-50  124.4 (c)  1971-75  110.0 
1951-55  141.6  1976-80  109.1 
1956-60  122.7  1981-85  87.2 
1961-65  111.9  1986-90  67.2 
1966-70  112.8    
Notes: (a) Weighted by 1979-81 developing country export values; (b) Deflated by using the unit 
value index in US dollars of manufactures exported by G-5 countries; (c) Three-year average.  
Sources: World Bank, Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets, June 1991. 
    Prices in the five years 1986-90 averaged barely one-half the level recorded forty years 
ago, in 1948-55. Most of the decline occurred in 1980-90, but there also was a significant 
downward movement in the earlier decades.  
    Chart III shows the indices of real prices computed for the period 1900-86 for 24 non-
fuel commodities (GYCPI/MUV line) and for 26 commodities including oil and coal 
(GYCPI'''/MUV line), by World Bank analysts Enzo R. Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang.82 
They have linked to their index the indices for the period 1870-1899 computed earlier by 
The Economist, London, and Nobel Prize winner professor Arthur Lewis. Downward 
trend over 120 years is unmistakable, although the two world wars, the Korean war and 
the events in the Middle East in the 1970s provided what turned out to be temporary 
reliefs. If the last five years 1987-91 were added to the chart, the picture would be even 
gloomier.  
    The Economist's index "has tumbled to virtually its lowest level in real terms in its 
150-year history", according to The Economist of 10 August 1991.  
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    The World Bank expects that non-oil commodity prices will continue to fall over the 
next two years, then stabilize in the mid-1990s, and recover about 10% during the 
subsequent decade. Recovery in oil prices during 1995-2000 is expected to be somewhat 
stronger.  
   
 
Table IV. World Bank price projections  
(constant US dollars, 1979-81=100) 
  33 Commodities  33 Petroleum 
Actual 1986-90 average  67.2  44.3 
Actual 1990  62.1  53.6 
Actual 1991  58.2  42.7 
Projections  56.1  38.4 
1993  55.2  39.7 
1994  56.0  41.6 
1995  56.9  42.8 
2000  61.9  54.4 
2005  60.5  51.7 
Notes:(a) Excluding energy.  
Source: World Bank, Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets, April 1992. 
    An implicit assumption of price recovery seems to be that prices now are at or below 
costs of production. But in developing countries, wages, a major component of costs, 
have been falling as export prices fell; hence production costs are to some extent a 
moving rather than a stable quantity and therefore further price declines are possible.  
    For export commodity prices of developing countries to stabilize and reverse course, 
which is badly needed, three conditions need to be met, in my view:  
   
    Investment in expansion of primary production for exports must be brought in line  
       with realistically estimated world demand. In the past, it has been excessive. It has         been argued that there has been no coordination among, and perhaps even within the  
       international agencies which have financed a considerable part of the investment.83  
    A new action is needed to conclude stabilization agreements on key commodities,  
       which would operate price bands adjustable over time, supported by international  
       stocks, export controls and national stocks, and stand-by production controls as  
       required.  
    Capacity of exporting developing countries, particularly those at low incomes, to 
time  
       their sales properly must be improved, so that they can deal with international trading  
       and finance companies on more equal footing than in the past. 
E. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS SELLERS AND BUYERS  
   
Export sales: insufficiency of market staying power  
    As matters now stand, the many financially weak producing countries, mostly low 
income, have a limited staying power in the international market. Financially unable to 
carry stocks and in urgent need of foreign exchange, the low-income countries are 
frequently compelled to sell competitively on a falling market the commodity surpluses 
which periodically inevitably arise because most commodity production is highly 
variable and cannot be adjusted quickly to changing demand. These distress sales, usually 
accompanied by sales from speculative stocks, force event the financially strong 
developing countries into competitive selling as they become concerned about a loss in 
market share. The pressure of sales occurs in the face of a limited number financially 
strong buyers in developed countries who postpone purchase in the expectation of still 
lower prices, apprehensive of losses on inventory if they buy prematurely. It is these 
circumstances which frequently lead to extremely sharp price falls and to associated 
declines in producers' incomes, sometimes disastrous. Even under normal circumstances, 
when crops are near average, the bunching of competitive sales in the face of a limited 
number of buyers will lead to erosion of the market price, or to special sales under the 
market, or both.  
    The losses incurred by low-income sellers in falling markets normally cannot be 
compensated by gains in rising markets. To achieve such gains, the sellers would need 
financial power to hold supplies off the market for a considerable time while it is rising. 
The developing countries do not have such financial power, although there are rare and 
temporary exceptions. If international public funds were available to help absorb 
temporarily the surpluses and gave the producers the breathing time to adjust their 
production and deliveries, distress sales would be avoided. More generally, low income 
countries would be able to time their sales properly and thus improve their bargaining 
position in relation to buyers in industrialized countries. Smaller quantities would be sold 
when prices are low, and larger when they are high.  
   Evidence  
    Numerous specific cases are known where substantial losses were sustained by low 
income producers because of inadequate financial power and improper timing of sales.84 
On a more general level, a study, carried out in 1978, established that in the fifteen years 
1961-75 developing countries were receiving considerably lower prices for their exports 
than the prevailing world market prices and the prices obtained by developed countries. 
Export unit values received by developing countries (i.e. the average prices at which their 
primary products were actually sold) were compared with market quotations. The same 
comparison was made for developed countries' exports of the same products. A sample of 
12-19 products was included. The following findings emerged:  
   
    In 1971-75, prices actually received by developing countries averaged 85 percent of 
world market prices.  
    Among the developing countries, it was the African countries, i.e. often the lowest-
income producers, which received the lowest prices: 80-82 percent of world market 
prices in 1971-75.  
    In contrast, the prices received by the developed countries were close to, or 
exceeded, world market prices: 94-101 percent in 1971-75.  
    The shortfalls experienced by developing countries widened during the fifteen years 
1961-75, from 12 percent in 1961-65 to 15 percent in 1971-75. For the African countries, 
they widened from 11 percent to 19 percent. The premiums of the exporting developed 
countries fell, from 4 percent above the market in 1961-65 to 1 percent. It follows that the 
share of the market price occurring to import trade increased, at the expense of producers, 
in all exporting countries, both developing and developed, with the worst deal 
experienced by the African producers.85 
    No similar investigation seems to have been undertaken of the developing country 
experience in the 1980s, but it would be surprising if it were any different. Foreign 
exchange was event more scarce in the 1980s than in the earlier periods, hence the 
pressure on debtors to sell at any price should have been even greater, and this probably 
explains, at least in part, the steepness of the export price fall experienced by the 
developing country producers in the 1980s.  
   
Import prices: the African case  
    A recent analysis by Dr. A. Yeats, a World Bank economist and formerly on 
UNCTAD staff, has established that African countries pay more for imports than other 
countries, developing and developed, on the average. 86 His finding is based on an 
examination of import prices of iron and steel into Africa from France during 1982-87, 
showing an average 20-30 percent premium over the price paid by other importers. He also provides additional material, suggesting that Africa pays higher prices for products 
other than iron and steel, and that it pays higher prices also to suppliers other than France.  
Among Dr. Yeat's findings are that:  
    the lowest-income countries pay the highest import prices;  
    as the quantity purchased increases, the relative import prices decrease;  
    as the total value of imports increases, the relative import prices decrease;  
    a developed country with countervailing power will normally pay less.  
   
    Implicit in these findings is that a poor payments position will lead to higher import 
prices through lower quantities purchased, lower value of imports, ad hand-to-mouth 
purchasing pattern.  
   
F. SITUATION IN PLANTATIONS, FARMS AND MINES  
Wages and living conditions on plantations  
    Committee on Work on Plantations of the ILO, in its 1982 report, commenting on the 
situation in thirteen countries, stated that "wages or incomes are too often below the 
poverty mark and do not permit the worker to meet the basic needs of his family."87 
Included were coffee, sugar-cane, rubber, palm oil, tea, coconuts, tobacco, cocoa and 
banana plantations -- all export crops.  
    In its latest report, in 1989, the Committee, commenting on the situation in seventeen 
countries, with the same product coverage as in 1982, stated that "The current situation of 
plantation workers is in many respects similar to that which prevailed 20 years ago."88 It 
then adds two important points:  
"Plantations managers have from the start been obliged to provide accommodation and 
specific social benefits in view of the remoteness of production sites from urban centres... 
Despite efforts in a number of countries to renovate existing dwellings or erect new ones, 
the buildings in which workers and their families are lodged are still too often old and 
lacking sanitary arrangements. In some countries accommodation conditions have 
actually deteriorated over the years for lack of upkeep... Moreover, the structure of the 
workforce on plantations has changed. In many countries there has been an ageing of the 
workforce, due partly to a lack of interest in the sector on the part of the younger 
generation.  
There is another worrying factor. To make up for difficult working and living conditions, 
the plantation sector generally used to offer relatively secure employment... Now, the proportion of permanent staff in the total workforce on plantations is diminishing and 
employers are more and more frequently resorting to temporary or seasonal workers... 
This practice has extremely serious social implications. Most of the benefits in kind are 
guaranteed, in practice or by collective agreement, only to permanent workers. Thus, a 
new social stratification is coming into existence, in which permanent workers, whose 
number is constantly decreasing in relative terms, form a class of better protected 
workers, while temporary workers are disadvantaged."89 
    Set forth on the next page are daily wage rates of plantation workers in 1983 or 1984, 
the last year for which reasonably comparable data are available.  
   
 
Table V. Daily wages of plantation workers, 1983 or 1984  
in U.S. dollars (a) 
Liberia  0.27  Mauritius  2.95 
Zaire  0.35  Honduras  3.33 
Sri Lanka  0.86  Seychelles  4.62 
India  0.96 (b)  Guyana  4.76 
India  1.20 (c)  Fiji  5.44 
Bangladesh  1.03  Suriname  5.49 
Madagascar  1.68  St. Lucia  5.83 
Zimbabwe  2.43  Belize  7.50 
Malaysia  2.46  Barbados  11.52 
   Venezuela  13.95 
Notes: (a) Original data were given in local currency. They were converted into US dollars at 
IMF-quoted market rated (International Financial Statistics). Original data were sometime given 
on a monthly or hourly basis; they were converted into daily wages using 25 working days per 
month and 40 to 50 hours per week, depending on the case; (b) Coffee and tea plantation; (c) 
Rubber plantations.  
Source: Jean Paul Sajhau and Jürgen von Muralt, Plantations and plantation workers, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1987, 
pages 136-37, 141 and 143. 
    The median daily wage is US $2.95. This value is heavily influenced by small 
countries in the Caribbean which have relatively high nominal wages. If these countries, 
as well as Seychelles and Fiji, are excluded, the median falls to US $ 1.35 per day. This 
wage level compares with the median of US $ 75.00 in manufacturing of 12 developed 
countries in 1983 (by 1989, this rose to US $ 120.000 per day).90 As purchasing power is 
much greater in developing countries, such comparisons have limited value -- see the 
earlier issues of the Human Development Report. Nonetheless, they provide some 
perspective to the fundamental inequality in the international exchange of export products 
embodying plantation labour and manufactured goods coming from factories of industrial 
countries.  
   
Real wages in agriculture      Table VI sets forth the readily available knowledge on real wages in agriculture in 
developing countries. This is a broader concept than wages in export industries; but in 
view of the importance of exports in most developing country agriculture and the 
likelihood that wage movements in the export and non-export parts move in parallel to a 
considerable degree, the data may be taken as indicative of the possible wage trend in the 
export sector.  
   
 
Table VI. Real wages in agriculture in developing countries  
A. Africa, indices 
  1971  1973 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983  1984  1985
Ghana  114  97 100 32 23 22 15  n.a.   n.a. 
Kenya  113  104 100 116 113 93 88  87  n.a. 
Tanzania  96  99 100 70 64 n.a.  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
Burundi  n.a.   117 100 n.a.  106 91 95  83  83
Cote d'Ivoire  111  103 100 62 57 59 56  52  n.a. 
Malawi  127  120 100 97 104 126 97  86  n.a. 
Swaziland  n.a.  92 100 146 132 143 142  n.a.  n.a. 
Zambia  n.a.  110 100 114 98 90 86  n.a.  n.a.
Zimbabwe  86  90 100 111 157 178 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
B. Asia, indices 
  1971  1973 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983  1984  1985
Burma  n.a.   140 100 115 105 105 100  n.a.   n.a. 
Bangladesh  n.a.  130 85 95 105 100 95  95  100
Philippines  n.a.  n.a. 90 90 80 80 80  70  70
South Korea  50  58 65 125 120 122 125  128  138
Malaysia           
Rubber tapers  75  90 65 100 110 90 90  65  n.a.
Palm harvesters  n.a.   80 98 120 90 130 100  120  n.a.
C. Latin America, annual growth rates 
  Type of wage  Mid-1960s to mid-1970s  End of 1970s  Early 1980s 
Argentina  average  1965-74  3.6% 1976-80 -21.9%  n.a.   
Brazil  average  1967-74  3.3 1974-80 1.8%  1980-83  -4.5%
Chile  minimum  1965-70  2.7 1975-81 4.7%  1981-84  -12.2%
Colombia  average  1965-70  0.5 1976-80 4.5%  1980-84  -1.2
Costa Rica  average  1971-74  -4.2 1974-79 11.7%  1979-83  -4.5%
Ecuador  minimum  1965-73  -7.2 1973-79 2.3%  1980-84  -12.1%
Guatemala  minimum  1965-70  -11.7 1977-80 -3.4%  1980-82  3.1%
Mexico  minimum  1965-77  3.7 1977-81 1.0%  1981-84  -15.0%
Panama  minimum  1965-73  3.6 1977-81 1.3%  1980-84  -3.3%
Paraguay  minimum  1966-76  -1.1 1976-80 3.0%  1982-84  -3.8%
Uruguay  average  1965-74  1.9 1974-80 -2.3%  1980-84  -6.3%
Source: International Labour Office, World Labour Report 3, 1987, Geneva, pages 71, 81 and 87. 
    In Sub-Saharan Africa, between 1971 and 1984, real agricultural wages fell in seven 
countries out of nine. In Asia, between 1973 and 1985, they fell in four series out of six. In Latin America (11 countries), they rose at a median rate of 1.8 percent per year 
between the mid-1960s and end 1970s, but then fell at 4.5% per year in the early 1980s. 
On the whole, it was an unfavourable record, influenced, at least in part, by falling export 
prices. In Malaysia, this influence is formalized: plantation wages move in accordance 
with export prices, with allowance for productivity growth. The latter was very strong in 
palm oil, therefore real wages rose despite falling prices; but in rubber, real wages fell as 
the decline in export prices was the dominant force.  
   
Distribution of gains from productivity growth  
    In the judgment of the ILO staff, productivity growth in export industries in developing 
countries resulted mostly in falling export prices rather than in rising domestic wages 
during the last several decades. The known exceptions are only Malaysia, where both 
palm oil and cocoa production booms led to a shortage of labour and rising wages, and 
Mauritius where growth of diversified industrial exports led to a liquidation of 
unemployment and shortage of labour in the sugar industry in less than a decade. But in 
other countries, the main beneficiaries of productivity growth in export industries appear 
to have been importers abroad. A partial statistical confirmation of this assessment is 
found in the evidence that labour productivity rose in the agricultural sectors of C™te 
d'Ivoire, Kenya and Malawi during 1970-84, while their agricultural real wages fell.91 In 
coffee, "as a general rule, most of the gains from increased productivity have accrued to 
consumers in periods of low prices, and to state agencies in periods of high prices. They 
have not resulted in increased wages in real terms to plantation labourers".92 And as 
periods of low coffee prices have been much longer than the periods of high prices -- 
please see Chart II, page 31 -- most of the gains have gone to the consumers. In Central 
America, over the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, banana output per 
hectare more than doubled as the producing countries switched to Panama disease-
resistant varieties, capital per worker increased by nearly four times, whilst the number of 
workers per hectare decreased by around 20%. With wages approximately constant in 
real terms, the major beneficiaries of this rapid technical change were the producing 
companies and the consumers, who experienced a fall in the real price of bananas of 
about 50%."93  
    The issue goes beyond agriculture. In its Trade and Development Report 1990, 
UNCTAD has argued that "higher productivity is a major factor behind expanding 
output, which is the main cause of lower export prices for several export commodities of 
developing countries. Palm oil and cocoa are good examples in this respect in the 
agricultural field, where productivity has increased because of cloning and hybrids. In the 
case of metals, lower production costs have likewise exerted a downward pressure on 
market prices. For example, substantial cost reductions have been achieved for copper 
and tin in recent years, basically through a reduction in employment, profit-related wage 
rates, new technologies, closure of high cost mines and the coming on stream of more 
efficient installations."94  
   G. STABILIZATION  
Alternatives to stabilization  
    Compensatory financing. It has been argued that compensatory financing provided to 
developing countries experiencing export shortfalls is a generally superior substitute for 
commodity price stabilization. It will be readily agreed that such financing is an 
indispensable device for commodities where price stabilization is not technically feasible 
or cannot be agreed upon on other grounds: the number of commodities on which 
stabilization agreements can be concluded will be limited, and also, price stabilization 
will not help where the reason for an individual country's export shortfall is a decline in 
its own commodity supply, e.g. a crop disaster. But the difficulties with compensatory 
financing as a general remedy are three-fold: it lead to additional indebtedness of already 
indebted developing countries, it requires very large resources to be effective, and it does 
not prevent or moderate the multi-year production cycles. Moreover, in practice 
compensatory financing has become entangled in loan conditionality which has adversely 
affected its original purpose.95 Two recent international report have stated:  
"There has been a general recognition by the world community in the postwar period of 
the need for contingency provisions, by way of mechanisms for compensatory and 
supplementary financing, to be built into the operations of international financial 
institutions to cushion developing countries against a sudden reversal of their economic 
prospects. The establishment by the IMF in 1963 of a Compensatory Financing Facility 
(CFF) to provide assistance to developing countries facing unexpected shortfalls in 
exports was a limited response to this need. In the 1970s, the scope of this facility was 
expanded to include the financing of contributions to international buffer stocks of 
primary commodities and to cover unexpected increases in the cost of cereal imports.  
The increased uncertainty and fluctuations in the world economy in the 1980s -- and the 
continuing vulnerability of developing countries -- amply justify a further widening and 
deepening of the Compensatory Financing Facility. Unfortunately, the trend has been in 
the reverse direction. The CFF was originally designed to provide quasi-automatic 
support for developing countries whose export revenue fell sharply. Its initial 
conditionality was very low. Until the 1970s, the access limits which govern how much a 
country may borrow were also gradually increased. However, in the 1980s, under the 
ideological pressure of some developed countries, the IMF substantially tightened the 
conditions associated with support under this facility.  
In 1988, the IMF merged the CFF in a new Compensatory and Contingency Facility 
(CCFF). This has the merit of covering a wider range of external shocks than falls in 
export earnings and increases in cereal import bills. For example, it can also assist 
countries to meet unexpected increases in interest payments on external debt. But the new 
facility lowered the limit on drawings from 83 to 65 per cent of a country's IMF quota, 
and also made the conditionality more severe. Under the earlier CFF, countries could 
draw up to 50 per cent of quota without having to subject themselves to adjustment 
programmes prescribed by the Fund. By contrast, under the new facility almost all support is conditional upon the Fund's approval of adjustment policies. Compensatory 
drawings have been further tightened by the introduction of phasing. All these features 
involve a far more restrictive approach than the semi-automaticity originally associated 
with compensatory financing. The facility as it now stands is extremely complex and 
does not provide a reasonable assurance of support when a country is driven by external 
shocks to turn to the IMF."96  
"Compensatory finance is one way of providing bridging finance to tide a country over a 
temporary, self-reversing shortfall in foreign exchange earnings. While it should provide 
a relatively quick disbursement of foreign exchange, some difficulties have been 
experienced in its operations -- in its timeliness, the amount obtainable, the 
conditionalities which were progressively introduced and very tight repayment 
conditions. A new facility, providing short-term contingency financing, has recently been 
integrated into that of compensatory finance but because of the complications it 
introduced, this short-term contingency mechanism has not been used by African 
countries.  
A United Nations Secretary General's Advisory Group on Financial Flows for Africa97 
agreed in 1988 that the lack of an effective compensatory financing mechanism has 
contributed to the long-term financing problems of many African countries since it forced 
them to the less satisfactory ways to cope with the unpredictable changes in the export 
earnings of commodity producers. The [Fraser's] Group endorses this conclusion."98 
    Commodity risk management and finance. In recent years, the World Bank staff has 
been suggesting the use of "commodity price-related financial instruments" in order to 
manage the volatility of export earnings and import payments of developing countries. 
The common feature of such instruments "is to provide insurance against commodity 
price risk (i.e. unanticipated fluctuations), not to try to improve the average price... In 
other words, hedging... accepts market prices and trends, but aims to reduce risk..."99 
Three main types of financial instruments appear to be involved: futures contracts, 
commodity swaps, and commodity bonds.  
    Concerning futures contracts, the prospects of their widespread use and usefulness for 
developing countries appear limited. According to a recent study of the Venezuelan oil 
situation:  
"[In principle], it may be optimal to transfer the risk to some other agent using contingent 
claims such as futures and options. If such markets exist, it is possible to calculate a 
hedge ration that would optimally reduce the uncertainty in the income stream, given the 
costs involved and the benefits from risk reduction. By either selling the oil forward, 
selling futures or selling calls to buy put it is possible to look into a known oil price for a 
given period of time, thus eliminating any price uncertainty for that term.  
There is a problem with this solution: even though markets exist, and have been growing 
very fast in recent years, they still do not go far enough in time nor are they liquid enough 
to deal with a relevant fraction of Venezuela's oil uncertainty... Most oil-related futures contracts negotiated in open exchange markets go out for less than a year...Moreover, the 
markets are small compared to the volume of Venezuelan exports, while their liquidity 
drops dramatically with the time to maturity. For example, the total number of contracts 
outstanding on 9 April 1991...was 158.7 million barrels for one month deliveries (May), 
23.4 million for six-months delivery market. The market for futures options has similar 
problems. These only go out for three months and the volume of contracts negotiated are 
of the order of 120 to 150 million barrels for all maturities. This number must be 
contrasted to the 180 million barrels that Venezuela would export in that period of time. 
The lack of liquidity in these markets implies that if Venezuela really attempted to hedge 
a sizeable fraction of its risk, it could not take prices as given. Knowing this, other market 
participants would take into account the possibility that Venezuela may include this 
aspect in their assessment of the risk associated with the traded securities, making 
hedging very expensive." 100 
    Engel and Meller, after studying the situation in Chile and Bolivia, in addition to that 
of Venezuela, have concluded that "except in the case of a country which is not a world 
producer of importance, futures contracts do not offer an attractive mechanism of revenue 
stabilization." 101  
    Concerning commodity swaps (medium-term contracts involving exchange of 
specified cash flows at specified intervals, which can be used to effectively fix a 
commodity price in advance), the World Bank notes that "markets for commodity swaps 
are not yet as active as the currency and interest swap markets, and have been largely 
confined to metals and energy." 102  
    Commodity-linked bonds provide for variation of interest rate or principal or both in 
relation to the international price of the commodity. Alternatively, they can be issued as 
convertible to claims on specific quantities of the commodity at specific option prices. 
The opportunity for increased profit, if the commodity price rose, might make creditors 
willing to accept a lower interest rate, while any increased obligation at a higher 
commodity price would be more than offset from the country's standpoint by the 
increased capacity to service the instrument.103 In practice, complex and paradoxal 
situations may arise. In 1990, Algeria managed to borrow from a bank consortium against 
an oil-delivery contract stretching over several years. An interest rate margin above the 
London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) was fixed at a specific level for as long as the 
price of oil stayed within an agreed specific range. If the price fell below the range, 
Algeria was to pay an additional interest margin, because it now presented a greater 
credit risk. If the price went up above the range, Algeria again was obliged to pay extra 
interest, now because its capacity to pay was increased. It can, of course, be argued that 
without these provisions Algeria might not have been able to borrow at all, or would have 
had to pay much wider margin above LIBOR taking the transaction as a whole. But the 
fact that it had to accept an asymmetrical treatment -- to pay more both when the price of 
oil went up and when it fell -- raises doubts as to the fairness in the sharing of benefits 
and risks in this type of transaction: the international capital market will take some risk, 
but the debtor country will have to pay for it, and the crucial question is how much.      A broader problem concerns the overall commodity price effect of the use of 
commodity-linked bonds. If it is massive, it will stimulate more investment in primary 
production for exports on a world scale and thus contribute to a further pressure on 
primary product prices which are already in deep depression. If the use of commodity-
linked bonds is only sporadic, it will be of help to the individual country concerned -- 
provided it is able to conclude a favourable deal with its lenders and buyers -- but it will 
not make a serious dent to the commodity problem as a whole.  
    As practical steps, the World Bank proposes to continue with its technical assistance 
programme to individual countries in economics and finance of commodity risk 
management, and Meller and Engel recommend that the Latin American countries-
exporters of natural resources (energy and minerals) begin to operate in financial 
instruments, but in modest volume in order to acquire know-how and avoid any sharp 
increases in insurance premia and trading margins. It is probable that advances in this 
field will be slow in coming and of limited significance. In any case, existence of 
commodity-linked financial instruments and markets in developed countries has not 
eliminated the need for a widespread use of government programmes to support primary 
product prices and incomes. How can this be expected in the case of developing 
countries?  
   
Criticisms of international commodity agreements  
   
   
    Professor Gilbert, Oxford, Dr. Maizels, Oxford and formerly with UNCTAD, and the 
World Bank staff have made six criticisms of postwar international commodity 
agreements (ICAs):  
    ICAs can only be successful provided that they command a consensus in their  
      industries. This is particularly important in export control agreements, since otherwise  
      there can be no agreement on quota allocation. 104 Inability to reconcile the different  
      interests of the countries involved leads to erosion of the rules, smuggling, and  
      free-riding.105  
    The agreements have not been endowed with financial resources adequate for  
      achieving their specific stabilization objectives. Future ICAs should consider much  
      more carefully than hitherto the probable call on their finances which would arise 
from  
      alternative price range targets. 106 Dr. Maizels calls the role of finance crucial.  
    Prices or price bands have not been adjusted to ensure long-run equilibrium in 
demand  
      and supply. It has proved difficult to set appropriate prices and to adjust them  
      regularly to changing market conditions. 107      A commodity agreement normally runs for five years and the question arises whether  
      any international authority can be expected to deal satisfactorily with the long-term  
      problems which may dominate the dynamics of a particular commodity market. In  
      sugar, for example, the major problem has been persistent over-supply, the difficulties  
      of stabilization being greatly increased by the residual nature of the world market 
given  
      the heavily protectionist policy of major consuming countries. An agreement which  
      sets out merely to even out short-term fluctuations cannot be expected to achieve 
even  
      this limited aim if the underlying longer-term forces in the market continue to put  
      downward pressure on the price.108 In tree crops, the multi-year cycles call also for a  
      longer-term approach.  
    The agreements were poorly drafted, at least in some cases. This was  
      demonstrated by the controversy following the tin collapse (1985) as to whether the  
      buffer stock manager was acting within the terms of the agreement, and more  
      especially, by doubts as to whether member governments were legally responsible for  
      debts incurred on their behalf by the international authority.109 The collateral  
      arrangements with banks through pledging tin did not prove satisfactory. As the price  
      fell, the value of the collateral fell in proportion; in this "meltdown", either additional  
      collateral or cash had to be put up; as neither was available, the brokers' and banks'  
      loans partly failed. This would have been avoided if the agreement's borrowings, in  
      addition to collateral's cover had guarantees of member governments.  
    The agreements were not robust with regard to exchange rate changes. A major 
factor  
      behind the collapse of the tin agreement was that, as a consequence of the 
appreciation  
      of the U.S. dollar, the market was being supported at too high a level. The fluctuating  
      rates of major currencies led to "currency scissors" for tin stock assets, liabilities,  
      purchases, sales and valuation of the debt service.  
  
    The currency issue (item f) can be handled, perhaps by defining support prices in terms 
of SDRs (proposed by professor Gilbert), although additional action may be needed also, 
such as currency swaps and insurance. The issue of clarity of the agreements (item e) is 
also a technical problem which can be handled, although it raises the question of 
additional responsibility of governments. (They were prepared to take it in the case of the 
agreement on the Common Fund for Commodities, which is a problem which probably 
can be surmounted by having some provisions of agreements lasting 10-15 years and 
some five. Even the issue of price determination and updating (item c), while difficult, is 
now somewhat easier to solve than before: there is more realization in developing 
countries that competition from synthetics, new technologies and developed countries 
call for moderation in price objectives and for flexibility in a range of products. It is in 
the first two items -- consensus within the industry, and finance - where greatest efforts 
will need to be made.  Burden of export and production controls  
    In the case of export quotas and supply management, there are two adjustments: first, 
the burden is allocated internationally among countries through international quota 
allocation, and secondly, it is then allocated internally within each country amongst its 
various producers. Even where formal export quotas do not exist but it is government 
support purchases which are used to maintain export prices, there is still the problem of 
within country allocation.  
    International quota allocation is known; it is normally based on past exports, with some 
privileged position given to small producing countries. Much less is known about internal 
quota (or government purchase) allocation. Available information is set out in Table VII.  
   
 
Table VII. Internal allocation of the burden of export controls and of limitations on government 
purchases 









decides on size of 
output cut and form it 
will take 
Privileged position given to 
smallholders 
Situation of plantations is 
generally better as they have 
more resources for switching into 
alternatives. Smallholders may 
move into vegatable gardening, 
animal husbandry or urban jobs. 
Malaysia Rubber   
Most of burden falls on 
large plantations as they can 
be more easily controlled 
 
Malaysia Tin 
Local committees of 
producers, on whose 
assessment decisions 
there is right of 
appeal to a central 
committee 
Proportion of potential 
output applied to all 
producers equally 
Employment in small mines is 
more adversely affected because 
they are more labour intensive. 
But the same happens then price 
falls as small mines have higher 
cost 
Mauritius Sugar  Ministry of 
agriculture 
Privileged position of 
smallholders in allocation of 
acreage and in paying lower 
export tax 
 
Kenya  Coffee   
Privileged position of 
smallholders, but expansion 
subsequently checked 
 
Colombia Coffee   
Privileged position of 
smallholders, but some had 
to move to cocoa 
 
Brazil  Coffee 
Government and 
planters (Brazilian 
Coffee Institute; now 
abolished)  
When in effect, export quota 
is allocated to exporting 
firms, usually on past 
performance. This affects 
the amount they buy from 
Smallholders were adversely 
affected during GERCA 
diversification programme in 
1960s; some purchased land on 
credit elsewhere to grow producers, but producers are 
not allocated any production 
quotes 
soybeans; recently some are 
coming back to coffee, filling the 
gap left by Uganda and Angola 
coffees 
Sources: Malaysia: interviews with professor Meyanathan and Dr. David Eliiot, UNCTAD; William Fox, Tin -- the Working of a 
Commodity Agreement, London, 1974; Redzman Sumun, Status of the Tin Industry, Kuala Lumpur, April 1986 (mimeo.); 
Mauritius: work on the Commission of Inquiry into the Sugar Industry, 1983; Kenya, Colombia and Brazil: interview with Dr. 
J.A.N. Wallis; Brazil: communication from Dr. A.F. Beltrao and interview with Dr. J.O. Santos. 
    Three conclusions follow. First, it appears that in the majority of cases smallholders 
had a better treatment in the allocation of export quotas and supply management than the 
large plantations. Secondly, the latter were in a better position to absorb the export cut as 
they had more resources and facilities to switch into other activities than did the 
smallholders. Thirdly, if instead of export quotas or supply management, prices had been 
allowed to fall, smallholders would have been as much and probably even more adversely 
affected than with the imposition of export quotas and of supply management.  
   
A possible road ahead  
    Out of five international commodity agreements -- coffee, cocoa, sugar, tin and rubber 
-- only that on rubber is in operation. The other four need to be revived. Another four 
products -- tea, cotton, jute and copper -- were also in the list of "core" commodities of 
UNCTAD's Integrated Programme.110 In addition, there is petroleum. This is the scope 
of the task of stabilization with which developing countries need to cope initially.  
    The hard core of the commodity problem is in products of agricultural origin. In most 
developing countries, the agricultural sector occupies a key place in the economic 
structure. This is the sector in which most of the population works, and in which a high 
proportion of underemployed resources are to be found. This is the sector where most of 
the income is generated and where incomes are lowest. A sustained and broadly based 
growth process cannot occur if the agricultural sector stagnates. Agricultural incomes and 
productivity have to increase if there is to be effective and increasing demand for the 
goods and services which can be produced by those who cannot be effectively absorbed 
in agricultural production; and agricultural production, surplus to the requirements in the 
rural areas, has to provide for the growing needs of those employed in nonagricultural 
production. In three prosperous areas of the world economy -- North America, Western 
Europe and Japan -- vast programmes of support of agriculture are in operation, including 
price stabilization and support, income support, farm credit, government technical 
assistance, storage facilities, etc., which, for all their blemishes and even harm inflicted 
on the outside world, have shown two fundamental achievements: first, an enormous 
improvement of agricultural productivity and standard of living in agriculture, and 
secondly, a continuing generation of purchasing power which has supported the demand 
for manufactured goods and assisted a sustained economic growth over the last fifty 
years.  
    It is now clear that developing countries will have to rely essentially on themselves for 
building up and modernizing their agricultural support systems. With respect to crops for 
their own use, they can do this each on its own to the extent that resources permit. With respect to commodities that are exported, this lone approach can be taken only at a great 
cost because of falling export prices. Hence a collective developing country approach is 
necessary. Attempts to revive international commodity agreements and create new ones, 
covering both producing and consuming countries, should not be dropped; but for such 
attempts at universal arrangements to be successful, it is necessary that the developing 
countries reach a full understanding among themselves first as to the essentials of the 
specific schemes they want to pursue and be ready to implement on their own if 
necessary, to the extent possible.  
    The second crucial issue is that of finance for commodity stocks. A part of this finance 
would have to be supplied by the participating producing countries in the form of 
building national stocks, but under collective supervision of all participants. The other 
part, international stocks, can be financed to some extent by borrowing from commercial 
banks against commodity collateral: it was reported recently they might be prepared to 
provide as much as 50 percent of the money needed for a coffee retention scheme.111 
But the hard core of finance for international stocks would have to come from 
international financing agencies. The recently established Common Fund for 
Commodities is an obvious source; but it is reported that for the time being it focuses on 
preparatory work to support research and investment projects (Second Window) rather 
than on stabilization and stock financing (First Window). Their work programme and 
prospects for financing need to be explored with the Common Fund further. Possibilities 
of drawing on the IMF buffer stock financing, the amounts which might be available in 
competition with other claims on the IMF, and its current conditionality requirements 
should also be explored. But perhaps the main support for international stock financing 
can come from regional development banks. The President of the African Development 
Bank, at its annual meeting in Cairo in June 1987, stressed the need for efforts to achieve 
the critically required effective stabilization of export commodity prices, and urged an 
exploration of concepts and steps for this purpose.112 There is a long tradition of close 
relations between the Inter-American Development Bank and the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean which had pioneered the analytical and 
policy work in this area. The Asian Development Bank's views probably will be sensitive 
to the thinking of India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Thailand, all major primary product exporters among its members. 
Regional development banks have been engaged recently in exploring the areas for their 
cooperation: a coordinated and imaginative action on the commodity problem would 
seem to be both most useful and most urgent. Of course, no international financial 
institution can act without agreement of key developed country members; but perhaps 
progress can be achieved in getting this agreement for creating international financial 
consortia for support of stabilization of specific commodity proposals, put forward by 
interested countries, contain:  
        (a)    a convincing economic justification in terms of economic benefits, costs, and 
risks;  
        (b)    a realistic and sound financing plan;          (c)    a credible statement of the likely financial outcome of its operations for the 
medium term;  
        (d)    an assessment of supporting measures, such as diversification and productivity  
                increase, needed to  make stabilization a long-run success; and  
        (e)    a scheme of cooperation with other agencies, national and international.  
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Part III: Developing Countries in the World Manufactures Market: 
Achievements and Problems  
   
A. GROWTH  
An overview  
    During the last thirty-five years, the developing countries as a group, in the wake of 
successful industrial and technological changes, have managed to increase their share of 
world exports of manufactures from 4.1 % (1955) to 18.75 % (1989). 113 The latter 
percentage exceeds that of Germany (F.R. - 14.85%), Japan (12.8%) and the most 
important structural changes in the world economy since the 19th century: it has broken 
the monopoly of industrial countries in the most lucrative market and opened the door for 
self-reliant growth in the South through the development of its capital goods industry.  
    Between 1975 and 1990, the volume of developing country exports of manufactures 
increased more than five-fold, compared to a two-fold increase for developed countries.  
Table I. Exports of manufactures, 1975-90 (a) 
   
  1975  1980  1985  1989  1990 
A. In billions of US $  
Developing countries  39.42  126.16  182.69  390.30  420.00 
Developed countries        Germany, F.R.   79.62  166.92  161.58  309.59  361.92 
Japan  53.17  124.50  170.88  266.59  277.44 
U.S.  70.97  144.09  145.34  245.17  282.46 
All Developed countries  433.85  923.10  955.64  1,687.80  1,956.40 
 
Developing countries  100  189  296  523  553 
Developed countries        
Germany  100  135  174  211  215 
Japan  100  156  225  244  256 
U.S.  100  133  109  160  180 
All developed countries  100  137  164  204  214 
   
Note: (a) Exports of Eastern Europe and USSR are not included.  
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1991 and March 1992. 
   
    The bulk of exports of manufactures from developing countries comes from a small 
number of economies: in 1988, five top countries accounted for 54% of total developing 
country manufactured exports. Nonetheless, both the number of countries exporting 
manufactures in significant amounts -- more than US $ 1 billion per year -- and their 
export volumes have been increasing rapidly.  
Table II. Top 20 developing countries exporting manufactures 
rate of growth in volume of manufactured exports, p.a. 
   
 




value   
US $ million 
1980-88  1970-80 
South 
Korea  56,432 13.7 23.4 
Taiwan  55,486 13.1 16.1 
Singapore  27,554 7.3 18.2 
Hong Kong  26,597 11.2 10.5 
China  21,995 12.5 8.3 
 
Brazil  17,262 6.0 18.8 
Mexico  10,393 19.1 6.3 
Yugoslavia  9,850 0.5 7.2 
Malaysia  9,197 14.8 15.1 
India  8,605 4.5 7.5 
Thailand  8,033 17.6 16.2 
Turkey  7,492 23.3 13.2 
Indonesia  5,623 30.3 20.8 
Pakistan  2,961 10.1 -0.4 
Argentina  2,889 -1.3 9.1 
 
Philippines  2,274 3.8 25.6 Egypt  2,016 7.7 -10.4 
Morocco  1,807 11.3 13.7 
Tunisia  1,617 8.3 19.3 
Colombia  1,207 0.3 12.8 
   
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat, based on data from the U.N. Statistical Office and other official international sources. 
   
Sub-Saharan Africa  
    Most of the expansion of manufactured exports has been concentrated in more 
advanced developing countries. But industrialization drive has been almost universal, and 
expansion of non-traditional exports has been a policy target virtually everywhere. 
Perhaps the most striking and the least known development in Africa during the last two 
decades has been a significant growth of manufactured exports:  
    Between 1980 and 1987, exports of manufactures from Sub-Saharan African 
countries  
      rose 42% in U.S. dollar terms, or at 5.7 percent per year. For 1988, out of 33  
      countries for which data are available, exports of manufactures rose in 28, and the  
      overall increase for the 33 was 15.6%. For 1989, out of 6 Sub-Saharan countries for  
      which data are available, exports of manufactures rose in five.  
    In 1988, eleven Sub-Saharan African countries exported manufactures in excess of 
US  
      $ 100 million each, compared to seven in 1980; in 1965 (and in 1969), there was 
none. 
Table III. Exports of manufactures from Sub-Saharan Africa above US $ 100 million each in 1988 
(US $ millions) 
   
  1965  1980  1988 
Mauritius  0  125  692 
Zimbabwe  61  404  638 
Botswana  1  353  540 
Côte d'Ivoire  15  295  317 (a)  
Kenya  14  210  200 (a)  
 
Senegal  4  72  182 
Gabon  10  26  165 
Cameroon  6  50  164 
Nigeria  17  130  155 
Congo  24  64  14 (b)  
 
Zaire   28   158   44  
   
Notes: (a) 1989; (b) 1987  
Sources: World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 1989, page 250; World Bank, World Tables 1991. 
   There also have been setbacks, for various reasons. But taking Sub-Sahara as a whole, to 
achieve a 60% increase in exports of manufactures to US $ 4 billion on a non-negligible 
base of US $ 2.5 billion in 1980, over an eight-year period marked by a commodity 
collapse and associated curtailment of the capacity to import, droughts, debt crisis, wars 
and policy disasters, is remarkable by any standard.  
   
B. FALLING REAL EXPORT PRICES  
Between 1980 and 1990, prices of manufactures exported by developing countries rose 
12 percent (unit values in U.S. dollars), in money (nominal) terms. In comparison, prices 
of manufactures exported by developed countries rose by 35% in the same period. 
Furthermore, prices of manufactures exported by G-5 developed countries (Germany, 
Japan, U.S., U.K., and France), weighted proportionately to the countries' exports to 
developing countries, rose by 39%; and prices of machinery and equipment exported by 
Germany, Japan, U.S., and Sweden rose by 48%. The GNP deflator of G-5 countries, 
measuring the overall aggregate price increase in these countries, rose 58%, and the 
consumer price index in G-7 countries (G-5 plusCanada and Italy) rose 57%. 
Consequently, in real terms, prices of manufactured goods exported by developing 
countries fell, the size of the fall depending on the index used. Table IV shows the range 
of these falls. Their average, about 30 percent, can be taken as the probable fall in 
developing country export prices of manufactures in real terms, or 3.5 % per year.  
Table IV. Fall in developing country export prices of manufactures in real terms, 1980-90, range 
   
   Percent 
(1)  When adjusted by the index of export prices of developed countries  20 
(2)  When adjusted by the index of export prices of G-5 countries  24 
(3)  When adjusted by the index of export prices of machinery and equipment 
of 4 developed countries  32 
(4)  When adjusted by the consumer price index of G-7 countries  40 
(5)  When adjusted by the GNP deflator of G-5 countries  41 
(6)  Average of (1) through (5)   31 
   
Sources: Indices (1) and (3) from the UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June 1991 and August 1911; indices (2), (4) and (5) from 
the World Bank, Revision of Primary Commodity Prices and Quarterly Review of Commodity Markets, 29 July 1991. 
   
This finding is consistent with the estimates of the World Bank and UNCTAD. The 
World Bank indicates that already in 1973-80 export prices of developing countries 
increased at a much slower pace than the export prices of developed countries (6.8 
percent per year, compared to 10.7 percent); while in 1980-87, export prices of 
developing countries fell in money (nominal) terms -- and even more in real terms -- 
while developed country export prices continued to rise.114 UNCTAD shows a reduction 
in export until values of developing country manufactured exports in 1980-85, followed 
by recovery in 1986-89, 115 but the recovery was probably no higher than the price 
increase in developed countries. Furthermore, it is reported that in 1991 export prices of 
Latin American manufactures are falling both in real and in money (dollar) terms.  Why the fall in developing country export prices of manufactures? Three reasons may be 
listed, and all of them worked simultaneously.  
   
    Devaluations in developing countries, partly under the pressure of debts and  
      conditionality, forced out exports in excess of market demand at unchanged prices,  
      and got the prices down.  
    Slow-down in the world economy since 1980 compared to the earlier period 
weakened  
      the aggregate demand.  
    The sheer mass of additional export production placed on the market by an increasing  
      number of sellers, some of them operating from export processing zones and having  
      no other outlet but exports even when export demand is weak, tended to drive down  
      selling prices.  
  
C. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO DEVELOPED COUNTRY MARKETS  
Tariffs  
    "Successive GATT rounds, and particularly the Tokyo Round, have succeeded in 
lowering tariffs considerably in the industrial countries. The post-Tokyo weighted 
average most-favoured-nation rates (MFN rates) have fallen to 5.6, 5.5 and 4.8 percent 
respectively in the EEC, Japan and the U.S. In all these markets exports of Third World 
countries face higher average MFN rates than exports of industrial countries. Average 
also blur substantial discrepancies and peaks. In the EEC, Japan and U.S., tariffs above 
10 percent still account for 21.5, 17.1 and 16.0 percent respectively of all tariff lines. 
Most of these high percentages are concentrated in food and textile and clothing 
categories, items of most interest to the Third World. Also, bound tariffs in agricultural 
items are small, which means industrial countries can raise them at will. There are also 
problems of tariff peaks and tariff escalation at every stage of processing." 116 Chart I 
shows the bias against processed products in the tariff structures of industrial countries.  
Chart I. Average tariffs in industrial countries for selected primary and processed 
commodities - not yet available 
   
   
Non-tariff barriers  
    It is non-tariff measures (NTMs) which have been the main obstacles to expansion of 
developing country manufactured exports. They have proliferated during the last several 
decades and now affect some of the key product groups in which developing countries 
have a major advantage. In the assessment of the World Bank staff, almost one-half of OECD imports in 1986 was affected by non-tariff measures: 54% in the European 
Community, 45% in the U.S., and 43% in Japan.117 The 1986 aggregate OECD 
restriction effect was double the level in 1966. 118  
    Table V sets forth the 1990 incidence of selected non-tariff barriers, as computed by 
UNCTAD. These measures affect more than 22% of non-fuel developed country imports 
from developing countries; this is a proportion one-third higher than in the case of 
imports from other developed countries. An analysis of a detailed breakdown for 1988 
shows that the most important single non-tariff measure affecting developing countries is 
the Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA), which restricts developing countries exports of 
textiles and clothing: it affects some US $ 36 billion worth of trade, of which US $ 14 
billion corresponded to agricultural products. Countervailing and anti-dumping actions 
affected about US $ 8 billion of trade, covering a wide range of products. Price control 
measures, including variable levies, affected about US $ 4.5 billion of trade, covering 
principally agriculture. Some US $ 8 billion worth of trade was covered by "voluntary 
export restraints" (VERs).  
    The figures quoted above and the percentages shown in Table V are only illustrative. 
They show the trade that was affected; they do not show the potential of trade that would 
have taken place on the basis of new investment and associated employment if non-tariff 
obstacles had not existed in the first place. It is a testimony to the vitality of developing 
country export industries -- and to the existence of loopholes in the protective legal 
system in developed countries -- that manufactures have shown such rapid export growth 
in the past; but there is no doubt that a much larger export flow, particularly in textiles 
and other light industry, steel, shipbuilding, and electronics would have taken place had it 
not been for the barriers and the severity with which they have affected the developing 
countries. At the end of 1990, there were in existence 284 export-restraint-type 
arrangements involving GATT members. An many as 107 of these covered product 
groups in which developing countries are substantial actual or potential exporters: 
agricultural products (59), textiles and clothing (51), steel and steel products (39), 
electronics (37), and footwear (21 arrangements).119  
    One of the severe non-tariff barriers have been anti-dumping and countervailing 
actions taken against imports. The number of outstanding cases world-wide, of which the 
over whelming number is in developed countries, stabilized between 1987 and 1990, but 
within this table total, the number of cases against developing country exports increased 
20%. Developing country exports accounted for 35% of the total number of antidumping 
and countervailing cases in 1987; by 1990, the proportion rose to 45%.120 These 
proportions are very much larger than the shares of developing countries in total world 
exports and in world exports of manufactures.  
Table V 
Import coverage ratios (a) of selected non-tariff measures (b), by country groupings, applied in 1990 
by selected developed market-economy countries (c) 
   





Eastern Europe  BroadNarrow Broad Narrow Broad Narrow  Broad  Narrow
0+1+22+4  All food items  35.9 31.8  41.8  35.4  28.7  26.6  56.7  54.9 
0  food and live 
animals  39.3 34.5  47.3  39.2  31.0  28.7  61.1  59.3 
22  Oil seeds and nuts  7.4  6.9  5.7  4.9  10.3  10.3  8.5  8.5 
4  Animal/vegetables 




materials  4.3  2.9  3.4  2.5  5.9  3.9  5.7  2.1 
27+28+67+68 Ores and metals  17.9 11.6  20.4  14.2  11.9  5.6  25.3  15.9 
67  Iron and steel  52.9 35.3  56.8  40.7  40.6  19.7  67.1  44.0 
68  Non-ferrous metals  0.8  0.2  0.8  0.1  0.3  0.1  2.4  1.4 
3  Fuels  17.9 13.5  23.8  17.2  12.6  9.3  43.8  36.9 




chemicals  17.8 11.0  15.5  7.2  24.2  21.2  18.9  14.6 
61  Leather  13.2 1.3  7.4  1.7  16.8  1.0  16.2  2.5 
65  Textile yarn and 
fabrics  38.7 34.3  17.0  11.8  61.6  58.1  69.3  61.2 
84  Clothing  63.1 56.6  27.6  6.8  71.6  68.5  75.1  72.9 
85  Footwear  19.7 8.0  14.2  0.2  20.9  10.9  52.5  6.1 
0-9 less 3  All items, excluding 
fuels  18.5 12.5  16.8  9.6  22.4  19.2  22.7  17.1 
0-9  All items  18.4 12.6  17.1  9.9  19.9  16.8  30.4  24.4 
   
Source: UNCTAD Data Base on Trade Control Measures. Reproduced in: Protectionism and Structural Adjustment, op.cit.  
(a) Ratios have ben computed using as far as possible 1988 trade weights; otherwise trade statistics for 1986 (or 1989 in the 
calculations regarding the United States) were used.; (b) The "broad" group of NTMs includes certain para-tariff measures, 
surcharges, variable levies, anti-dumping and countervailing actions, quantitative restrictions (including prohibitions, quotas, non-
automatic licensing, state monopolies, "voluntary" export, restraints and restraints under MFA and similar textile arrangements), 
import surveillance, automatic licensing and price control measures. The "narrow" group of NTMs excludes from the "broad" 
group defined above, para-tariff measures, antidumping and countervailing actions, automatic licensing and import surveillance 
measures.; (c) Australia, Austria, Canada, EEC (12), Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
States. 
   
    In the time remaining for the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
the developing countries are facing a formidable undertaking of persuading the developed 
countries to make substantial progress in opening their markets to developing country 
exports.  
   
D. IMPORT LIBERALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS  
    In reporting to the GATT Council in April 1991, Dr. Dunkel, Director-General, stated 
that some 30 developing countries and several Eastern European countries had liberalized 
their imports since the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986.121 Professor 
Henderson, Head of the Economics and Statistics Department of OECD, stated in May 
1991 that "For the first time in economic history the impetus to trade liberalization is not coming from industrial countries which profess to accept liberal norms, but rather from 
countries whose past tradition has been to reject them."122 The representative of Brazil 
in trade negotiations, speaking on behalf of a group of developing countries, said on 30 
July 1991 that "without waiting for the conclusions of the Uruguay Round, we have 
opened our markets: we have reduced our tariffs, we have given away our non-tariff 
measures and our exceptions for balance of payments protection. We have not kept 
waivers, derogations, grey area measures as bargaining chips for the last stage of 
negotiations."123 In a number of cases, import liberalization has been motivated by the 
country's belief that rigid trade and foreign exchange controls introduce distortions, may 
adversely affect exports, and are difficult to enforce. In most cases, import liberalization 
has been one of the key conditions for financial support extended by the IMF and the 
World Bank in its structural adjustment loans.  
    Countries which dismantle or reduce their import restrictions unilaterally do not obtain 
"credit" for these actions automatically at GATT negotiations,124 and possibly in their 
bilateral trade negotiations as well. As of mid-1991, the situation at GATT was 
unresolved. In its July 1991 report on GATT activities in 1990, and referring to the 
unsuccessful Uruguay Round meeting held in Brussels in early December 1990, the 
Secretariat states that "while there were significant {concession) offers on the table, 
serious problems remained... differences remained on the approach to be used to give 
credit for tariff bindings, and the appropriate level of recognition to be accorded to 
autonomous liberalization measures taken since the start of the Round. A number of 
developing and East European countries had taken such measures."125  
    A sea of ink has been spilled in trying to convince the developed countries to reduce 
and eventually eliminate their trade barriers on developing country exports, in the interest 
of these latter countries' growth, as well as in the interest of improvement of welfare in 
the developed countries themselves. Without these writings, the situation today may have 
been worse; but it is difficult to see any improvement, The reason for ineffectiveness of 
arguments and appeals was stated by Sir Edmond Dell, the former British Trade Minister, 
succinctly and clearly:  
"Trade negotiations are about reciprocity, that is an exchange of reciprocal concessions, 
not about unilateral gestures or 19th century liberalism.126" 
    If it is true that it is reciprocity which counts in international trade negotiations, two 
things follow for developing country policy makers and their bankers:  
a.  Except when they decide that unilateral import liberalization is in their direct 
national interest, developing countries should resist external pressures for such 
liberalization since they need it is a bargaining asset in trade negotiations with 
developed countries. By the same token, their lenders should reconsider their 
conditionality requirements, in the interest of their borrowers and thus of 
themselves: why should they, pressing for unilateral import liberalization, deprive 
their customer of the opportunity to obtain a wider foreign market and better 
prices? b.  Developing countries are not likely to get a significant opening of developed 
country markets without counter-concessions in trade in goods and services. Since 
the developed country markets are much larger than those of developing 
countries, the latter will be a net gainer, under good negotiating circumstances. 
The developing countries' negotiating strength will increase if they negotiate as a 
group, since they would be offering a broader market. This would be more 
practicable in regional groupings across products, or in particular products across 
countries, than globally with respect to both countries and products; although the 
latter would be desirable. 
   
   
E. EXPANSION OF TRADE AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
    Another avenue for widening the market of developing countries and reducing the 
pressure on their export prices is expansion of South-South trade. This has been a long-
standing objective. In an important respect, of fundamental nature, conditions for its 
realization are now nearer than before. As stated by the South Commission:  
"Progress within the South can give new substance to the process of cooperation among 
developing countries. Many of them have greatly diversified their economies in the last 
three decades. High levels of industrialization have been achieved, giving rise to new 
complementarities among developing countries, both within regions and interregionally. 
These broaden the potential scope for flows of trade, technology, and capital between 
developing countries on mutually beneficial terms. The newly industrializing economies 
of the South have now established their competitive credentials in a broad range of 
manufactured products, and in some cases are outselling the North in world markets. The 
increasing sophistication of the South's exports [is indicated by their growing] research 
and development intensity. Thanks to the high quality of its exports, the traditional 
prejudice against products from the South in the world at large, including the South itself, 
in breaking down."127 
   
    The need for expansion of South-South trade has been put forward recently by 
professor Singer, a well known development economist and social scientist:  
"It is an anomaly that the 75 percent or so the world's population who live in Third World 
countries should only do some 7 percent of their world trade with each other whereas the 
12 percent or so of the world's population living in the western industrialized (OECD) 
countries should do over 79 per cent with each other. There is no economic rhyme or 
reason for this. Third World countries have become more dissimilar to each other in the 
post-second world war period while industrial countries have become more similar. And 
it is a well-established theorem of foreign trade, ever since the days of Adam Smith and 
Ricardo, that foreign trade flourishes on the basis of different endowments. So why is it 
that, over the past two decades, the volume of developing countries' intra-trade has only increased by 3.9 percent per annum whereas that of developed countries has increased by 
5.2 percent."128 
   
    A Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) has been envisaged as a major 
instrument of South-South trade cooperation. It became effective in April 1989, after a 
process of negotiations started in 1976. A system for promoting interregional trade 
among developing countries, it is based on the principle of mutual advantage. In order to 
ensure that all participants benefit equitably, it takes into account differences in levels of 
industrial and economic development and trade, and contains special provisions to favour 
the least developed countries. The scheme is seen as complementing existing regional 
and subregional preferential trading arrangements. The GSTP Agreement establishes a 
global framework of rules for the reciprocal exchange of concessions as regards tariff, 
para-tariff, and non-tariff measures covering all types of products, for direct trade 
measures including medium-and long-term contracts, and for sectoral agreements. 
However, the trade liberalization implicit in the first round of negotiations within the 
GSTP, in which countries exchanged bilateral concessions in April 1988, is not very 
significant. As of now, the GSTP is largely of symbolic value, concludes the South 
Commission, and sets a challenge that it evolve a coherent strategy so as to ensure that by 
the year 2000 the GSTP will cover a substantial proportion of the intra-South trade. a 
href=#foot129>129  
    The key question in trade expansion and in South-South economic cooperation 
generally is that of finance. This became clear during the intensive work on this 
cooperation in the early 1980s, when the proposal for the establishment of a South Bank 
was formulated.130 It envisaged an institution with a broad mandate, covering trade 
financing, support to payments arrangements of developing countries, commodity 
stabilization, investment (project) finance and balance of payments finance. The 
governments of developing countries have not yet reached agreement on the 
establishment of the bank. South Commission has supported the proposal, with a 
suggestion that its different functions may evolve gradually, starting with export 
financing and support to payments arrangements.131 In July 1991, UNCTAD organized 
a meeting of an Expert group on trade financing mechanisms in and among developing 
countries. The meeting concluded that:  
a.  Many developing country exporters suffer an acute paucity of foreign exchange 
resources for trade financing. This paucity of credit exists for all classes of 
exports, especially non-traditional exports for a wide range of developing 
countries in different stages of development. 
b.  In most developing countries there are functional and institutional gaps in the 
financial 
 
infrastructure which cannot be met by domestic resources. Consequently, there 
are real merits to the idea of establishing an International Trade Financing Facility 
(ITFF) as complementary to national institutions and initiatives.  c.  A facility which finances and refinances in foreign exchange developing country 
exports can be commercially feasible. It should initially concentrate on short-term 
credit and increase gradually its medium-term credit. A broadly based 
shareholding would be highly desirable. The initiative for launching the Facility 
must come from developing countries and their institutions, public and private. 
The participation of developed countries and their institutions, public and private, 
and the appropriate multilateral funding institutions, would be crucial for its 
success and market credibility.132 
     Further technical work on the facility is envisaged, and the experts have also 
suggested broadening substantive consultations on the ITEF to include the multilateral 
financial institutions and the OECD Secretariat.  
    No order of magnitude of finance required for the Facility has yet been indicated.  
   
F. A POSSIBLE GROWTH MIX  
    If sufficient export outlets are not found either in developed country markets or in an 
expanded South-South trade, real export prices of manufactures of developing countries 
would continue to be under pressure, leading to further devaluations. This would partly 
sustain a competitive position in exports, but it would also stimulate import substitution. 
Furthermore, in light of possible losses on exports (private losses and official losses in 
the form of export subsidies) and resistance to devaluations, attractiveness of the 
domestic market may increase, both for market agent and for public authorities. There 
would be a partial shift away from almost exclusive emphasis on export growth, which 
has dominated the scene in the past decade, to a mixed pattern of production expansion 
both for the export and for the home market, but the latter under protection considerably 
lower than in the past.  
Annex 
Levels of protection 
   
    The table below shows tariff and non-tariff barriers in developing countries in 1987, 
i.e. before the liberalization of recent years.  
Tariff and non-tariff barriers in developing countries, 1987 
   
REGION  MANUFACTURERS  ALL GOODS 
  TARIFFS  NTBs  TARIFFS  NTBs 
East Asia  22  20  21  22 
South Asia  81  47  77  48 
Europe, Middle East & North Africa  26  31  24  32 
Africa  30  30  33  30 
Latin America and the Caribbean  34  20  33  21 
Average  34  27  32  28    
Notes:NTBs, non-tariff barriers. Data are unweighted tariff averages for tariffs. For NTBs, percent 
of all imports affected.  
Sources:World Development Report (World Bank) 1991, page 98, based on UNCTAD data for 1987 on eighty-two individual 
country sources. For Republic of Korea, World Bank estimates. 
   
    With the liberalization of recent years, it is probable that the average level of tariff on 
manufactures has fallen from 34% in 1987 towards a 25-30 % range. (I have not seen any 
specific estimate.) This remains much higher than the present average tariff in developed 
countries of about 5%; but we have also the Iglesias' statement of 15 November 1991 that 
"effective protection levels in Latin America now are nearly as low as in the 
industrialized countries."133 Historically, average tariff on manufactures in twelve 
industrial countries ranged from 11 to 32 percent between 1820 and 1950: 22 % in 1820, 
11-14 % in 1875, 17% in 1973, 19% in 1925, 32% in 1931, and 16% in 1950.134 The fall 
to the 5% level is of a very recent vintage and is offset, partly or fully, by the rise in non-
tariff barriers.  
    In non-tariff barriers, the average 1987 proportion in developing countries of 27-28% 
has now probably been brought down to under 25%. At this level, it is quite close to the 
proportion of imports affected by selected non-tariff barrier in developed countries of 20-
22 % (see Table V). The World Bank's World Development Report 1991 suggests that 
the developed country NTBs could be higher than the level estimated for developing 
countries in 1987 if the coverage was identical.135 For 1986, the Report has estimated 
the developed country barriers as affecting almost one-half of their imports (see page 6).  
    An up-to-date estimate on a comparable basis is needed on both tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in both developing and developed countries.  
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Part IV: Developing Countries in the World Services Market: Scope, Competitive Position and Reciprocity  
   
A. INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT THE Uruguay Round  
    G. Russell Pipe, a telecommunications policy consultant, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 
wrote in 1989, in the midst of the Uruguay Round negotiations:  
"To a considerable extent, the inspiration and pressure brought to bear on governments to 
launch multilateral negotiations on trade in services emanated from transnational 
corporations based in developed countries. TNCs and other enterprises are expected to be 
beneficiaries of an eventual agreement to create a liberalized environment allowing 
further globalization of their operations. International business has mobilized political 
and economic resources at the national level and through three principal international 
organizations. These are the Business and Industry Advisory Council (BIAC), a 
recognized body in the OECD: the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); and 
Coalition of Service Industries, a confederation of national coalitions in ten 
countries."136 
   
   
B. SCOPE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE BALANCES  
    The field of services is wide. Those of importance in international trade include: 
transportation, travel, telecommunications, audio-visual activities (film, television and 
other media), business services, engineering and construction, banking and financial 
services. Conventional analysis also adds income from property, including intellectual 
property, interest, and income from labour (labour remittances); the latter may frequently 
result from engagement in services trade; but the former -- earnings from property and 
interest -- are a function of ownership rather than of current trading activities.  
    Developing countries have a negative foreign exchange balance in services.  
Table I. Exports and imports of services of developing countries, 1984, in US $ billions 
   
  EXPORTS IMPORTS BALANCE 
All services  111.7  205.7  -94.0 
Shipping  8.0  31.8  -23.8 (a)  
Travel  20.1  16.1  4.0 
Passenger services  14.1  12.7  1.4 
Other transportation  10.3  9.2  1.1 
"Other" services  23.5  32.1  -8.6 
   
Note: (a) US $ 21 billion in 1987.  
Sources: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 1988, pages 289-92, based on IMF balance of payments statistics; Peter Faust, 
Shipping Services, in UNCTAD, Trade in Services: Sectoral Issues, 1989 page 124. 
       It is possible that the enormous size of the deficit (US $ 94 billion in 1984) is in large 
part a function of interest payments, although they are not specifically identified in Table 
I. These payments amounted to US$ 68.4 billion in 1984. 137 Deducting these from the 
aggregate deficit, leaves a deficit of developing countries in services net of interest of US 
$ 25.6 billion -- still a formidable figure on any reckoning. In the assessment of 
UNCTAD analysts:  
"Developing countries as a whole, and most developing countries individually, run 
deficits in trade in services, the main exceptions being the tourism sector, and the services 
rendered through the movement of labour abroad... In construction, for example, where a 
few developing countries have had a relative export success, this has been largely 
attributed to their ability to move persons across national frontiers."138 
   
   
C. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES  
    Analysts seem to be unanimous that foreign exchange deficits reflect a generally 
weaker competitive position of developing countries in most services that are 
internationally traded:  
"The competitive weakness of developing country vis-a-vis developed country firms in 
the world market appears to be a general phenomenon in all service sectors, thus 
underlying the need for any multilateral framework to take account of this situation and 
provide for compensatory action to increase the participation of developing countries in 
the world market for services." 139  
"In all sectors, even where developing countries may show 'strength' based on balance of 
payments figures, developed country firms would seem dominant."140  
"Developed countries overall are likely to be more competitive than developing countries 
in most services."141 
    The reason for this situation is comparative advantage of developed countries derived 
from factors which are not "natural", but are a result of the level and pattern of prior 
development: their endowment is a function of the amount of resources invested in 
research and development and education, of the existing industrial and technological 
development, as well as the state of regulation.  
"Firms from developed market economy countries are dominant in virtually all 
main traded service sectors. Their competitive strength is based upon the 
underlying comparative advantage inherent in developed economies as well as 
specific factors at the micro-economic level. Such factors include:  
        (a)    financial capacity;  
        (b)    accumulated knowledge and skills, and established reputation;  
        (c)    access to and domination of telecommunications and information 
technologies;          (d)    established relationships and market presence;  
        (e)    "networking" ability;  
        (f)    ability to provide a package of services;  
        (g)    domestic market size;  
        (h)    economies of scale; and  
        (i)    government incentives."142  
    Most of these elements are self-explanatory. Of particular interest and 
widespread effects is the financial capacity of firms. "Financial resources are the 
key factor in the competitiveness in the world market for a variety of service 
sectors. The more obvious ones are banking, securities trading and insurance, 
where the weakening of financial resources of developing country firms has 
resulted in a decline in their participation in world trade in these services, while 
even very large developed country banks are finding it necessary to merge to 
strengthen their financial capacity so as to maintain international competitiveness. 
Air transport is another sector where financial resources are becoming crucial 
given the pressing need for airlines to modernize their fleets. The provision of 
enhanced information services may involve important expenditure on 
infrastructure, not to mention that necessary to develop or acquire the 
technological capacity. Even in construction and engineering consultancy 
services, where the competitive position of developing countries may be 
somewhat stronger, financial resources, in the sense of the sense of the ability to 
finance a package of engineering services, construction and capital goods 
available to developed country firms, enables them to dominate international 
markets. Such situations are obvious in most service sectors where developing 
country firms simply lack the financial strength to compete, particularly given that 
one of the main competitive factors is the ability to move "upstream" and 
"downstream" and to offer a "package" of services. Regardless of technical 
competence, firms cannot compete in world markets without adequate financial 
backing. Asymmetries in the distribution of financial resources thus constitute a 
major factor distorting the possibility of an international division of labour in the 
service sector based upon comparative advantage. This would imply that the 
ability of developing countries to compete in trade in services, and thus to benefit 
from progressive liberalization by their trading partners, will be related to broader 
solutions to their financial and debt problems."143  
   
D. DEVELOPING COUNTRY COMPETITIVE SUB-SECTORS  
    Three sub-sectors where developing countries have shown some competitive 
strength, or where such strength is emerging, are discussed below. They are 
tourism, construction, and data processing.  
Tourism      which attract foreign tourists, on the one hand; and the poverty of broad masses 
of their population, which eliminates their capacity to travel abroad as consumers-
tourists, on the other.  
Most developing countries have promoted foreign tourism in recent years and in 
the process eliminated most of the administrative and trade obstacles to its 
development. Obstacles which have remained are mostly financial: lack of 
resources for tourism and infra-structure development, such as roads, other 
transportation, adequate water supply and reliable electricity. At the same time, 
benefits from tourist development are unequally shared. The existing statistics --
the "travel" item in the balance of payments account -- underestimate the size of 
the tourism market, as they omit much of the revenue obtained from the tourist 
before he leaves his own country; thus, developing countries are likely to have a 
much lower share of the overall "tourism" market than that indicated in balance of 
payments data.144 More important, world-wide tourist revenues are dominated by 
developed country firms which have been able to establish information networks, 
hotel chains, travel agencies and computer reservations systems (CRS).145 "The 
effect of these changes for the tourist industry in developing countries is mixed. 
On the one hand, the potential increase in efficiency and international contact is 
vital to a tourist industry that is distant from its clients. The networks create 
certainty and security for the client and hotel. Tourist resorts which are not able to 
get information into the network will find traffic diverted elsewhere. On the other 
hand, the cost of participating in these networks may be high in foreign exchange, 
serving as an added charge against potential earnings. The networks are likely to 
reinforce the market dominance of the larger hotels and tour operators, whose 
integrated management systems and co-ownership with airlines and network 
operators give them a pre-eminent position." 146 It has been suggested that 
developing countries, either singly or in cooperation with other developing 
countries, can set up their own national or regional networks of information in 
order to maximize their returns from tourism. 147  
   
Construction and engineering design (CED)  
    Developing countries had great expectations in the early 1980s that both their 
volume and share in international construction will grown steadily. These 
expectations were based on the successes achieved following the oil boom in the 
producing countries, and the technological and managerial breakthroughs which 
several developing countries had made. In the judgment of a 1987 study of the 
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, an agency of the U.S. Congress:  
"Many foreign engineering and construction firms, including those in the 
Third World, can now adapt and apply a relatively broad group of 
technologies as needed. Once the backbone of the U.S. industry, 
technologically based strategies are now open even to firms from the NICs, many of which have become quite competent in design and 
engineering."148 
    The results did not meet the expectations. Developed country firms have 
remained dominant in this field. Developing country companies are still important 
players, but the slow-down in massive construction in the open markets of the 
Middle East has stopped these companies' advance and led to a setback.  
    In engineering design services, the international market as measured by foreign 
billings of top 200 international design firms amounted to US $ 4.2 billion in 
1988, compared to US $ 3.8 billion in 1983. About 70 percent of the international 
market is presently found in the developing countries, compared to 85 percent in 
the early 1980s. In 1988, Asia was the largest single market (US $ 1,150 million), 
followed by Africa ($ 824 million), the Middle East ($ 809 million), Europe ($ 
622 million), the U.S. ($ 388 million) and Latin America ($322 million). In 1988, 
10 of the 20 most attractive markets in the world were Asian countries, among 
them Indonesia, China, Thailand, the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Bangladesh, 
Australia and Singapore.  
    U.S. international design firms remain in a leading position with 25 percent of 
the aggregate market in 1988. Canada accounted for 16%. European firms as a 
group captured 47 percent, and Japan 6 percent. Among the developing countries' 
total of 6 percent, the Republic of Korea has maintained its share at around 1.5 
percent. Firms from a few other developing countries have also been present in 
the international market, but their individual shares remain small. 14 out of the 
top 200 international design firms came, in 1988, from developing countries, 
compared to 17 in the previous year. Two such firms, Dar Al Handasah 
Consultants, previously located in Lebanon and now based in Egypt, and 
Energoproject Consultancy and Engineering from Yugoslavia, figured among the 
top 20 international design firms. The other firms in the 200 came from Korea (3), 
India (3), Brazil (2), Yugoslavia (1), Hong Kong (1), Taiwan (1) and Saudi 
Arabia (1). However, "firms from developed countries control over 90 percent of 
the market and as such remain the undisputed leaders in this branch of the CED 
services industry."149  
    The international construction market, as measured by the value of foreign 
contracts awarded to the top 250 international contractors, amounted to US$ 94 
billion in 1988, more than twenty times the value of engineering designs billings 
in that year (see above). The 1988 construction total was an improvement over the 
previous several years, but was very much lower than the peak of US $ 134 
billion reached in 1981 (Table II). Foreign contracts as a proportion of total 
contracts have been declining steadily since 1982: this proportion was close to 
27% in 1987, compared to 52% in 1982. Developing countries accounted to 60% 
of the international construction market in 1988, down from 80% during the early 
1980s. The largest part of the market in 1988 was in Asia (US $ 20.5 billion), 
followed by Europe (US $ 19 billion), Middle East ($ 17 billion), U.S. ($ 13 billion), Africa $10 billion) and Latin America ($7.5 billion). Low levels in the 
latter two regions reflect the debt crisis.  
Table II.  
Market Share of International Construction  
(measured by new contracts awarded to the top 250 international contractors)  
(Billions of dollars, and per cent share in brackets)  
   
Country   1980   1981   1982   1983  1984  1985  1986   1987   1988 
United States   48.3   48.8   44.9   29.4   30.1   28.2   22.6   18.1   25.9  
  (45)   (36)   (36)   (31)   (37)   (35)   (31)   (24)   (27)  
France   8.1   12.1   11.4   10.0   5.4   6.7   7.1   8.6   11.1  
  (7)   (9)   (9)   (11)   (7)   (8)   (10)   (12)   (12)  
Germany, Fed. Rep. of   8.6   9.9   9.5   5.4   4.8   5.4   5.5   5.9   8.1  
  (8)   (7)   (8)   (6)   (6)   (7)   (7)   (8)   (9)  
Italy   6.2   9.3   7.8   7.2   7.8   8.7   7.4   9.2   13.3  
  (6)   (7)   (6)   (8)   (10)   (11)   (10)   (12)   (14)  
United Kingdom   4.9   8.7   7.5   6.4   5.7   5.6   7.0   7.9   9.4  
  (5)   (6)   (6)   (7)   (7)   (7)   (9)   (11)   (10)  
Other Europe   9.2   12.6   10.3   9.1   7.2   6.2   6.7   8.9   7.3  
  (8)   (9)   (8)   (10)   (9)   (8)   (9)   (12)   (8)  
Japan   4.1   8.6   9.3   8.7   7.3   11.6   9.4   9.9   11.6  
  (4)   (6)   (8)   (9)   (9)   (14)   (13)   (13)   (12)  
Rep. of Korea   9.5   13.9   13.8   10.4   6.8   4.8   2.6   2.1   1.4  
  (9)   (10)   (11)   (11)   (8)   (6)   (4)   (3)   (2)  
All other countries   9.4   10.5   8.6   7.0   5.9   4.4   5.6   3.3   6.0  
  (9)   (8)   (7)   (7)   (7)   (5)   (8)   (4)   (6)  
Total   108.3  134.4  123.1  93.6   80.5   81.6   73.9   73.9   94.1  
   
Source: Yehia Soubra, Construction and Engineering Design Services, in UNCTAD, Trade in Services, 1989, 
page 214, based on Engineering News Record, various issues, McGraw-Hill Inc.  
   
    U.S. continues to be the world's largest individual exporter of construction 
services, although its share is declining. In contrast, the shares of Italy and Japan 
are rising rapidly. Among the developing countries, the Republic of Korea 
continues to be present in the international market, but with its share constantly 
declining since 1983. Yugoslavia has also built up an export capacity in this 
sector: the construction specialties of Yugoslav firms, figuring on the list of the 
top 250 international contractors, encompass various types of projects, ranging 
from such infrastructure as buildings, bridges and railways to power plants and 
manufacturing facilities. Firms from other developing countries have also 
penetrated the international market, but their individual shares are very small. 
They come from India, Brazil, China, Singapore, Argentina, Mexico and Hong 
Kong. "Some kind of specialization of specific CED services and sectors helped 
these few countries to develop an export capability. While Korea specialized 
mainly in infra-structure related services, Brazil built up specific competence in mining and petroleum-related CED services, and India in steel and metal work. 
Very often the success of firms from developing countries in entering the 
international market was very much dependent on their ability to move skilled and 
unskilled labour to the construction site from their country of origin and/or other 
third-world countries."150  
    The firms from the developed countries have, since the early 1980s, increased 
their control of the international market with a share at present exceeding 90 
percent, while the position of developing countries has been worsening, with the 
decline in the share of the construction market from more than 15 percent to less 
than 5 percent.151 A part of this loss is due to unafavourable terms of contractor 
finance. "The financial packages offered by developing country suppliers are not 
as attractive as those provided by firms from developed countries. Financing 
remains one major obstacle for firms from developing countries to consolidate 
their position in international markets."152 It has been suggested therefore that 
effort would need to be made to facilitate access of developing countries to 
international financing, including a more explicit policy by international and 
regional financial institutions to promote further the participation of developing 
country engineering firms in the provision of CED services on projects funded by 
them in developing countries.153  
    The second factor has been the shrinking of the most dynamic export market in 
developing countries due to the fall in commodity prices and the debt crisis. 
Furthermore, partly as a result of government procurement policies, construction 
markets in developed countries tend to be relatively less open than in developing 
countries.154 Also, the decline in the developing market share of the international 
construction market might reflect to a large extent the existence of prohibitive 
barriers to the movement of personnel in developed country markets.155  
    "In the Uruguay Round discussions, developing countries have consistently 
maintained the position that any liberalization of trade in services, in the form of 
temporary movement of the factors of production, should provide [for] 
symmetrical treatment to the capital and labour factors. Although developed 
countries tend to view labour mobility as an issue that is regulated by immigration 
laws and regulations which embody national policy objectives, their submission 
to the GNS (Group of Negotiations on Services in GATT's Uruguay Round) 
recognizes that the process of liberalization of trade in services would have to 
cover temporary movement of persons. Such proposals have referred to the 
category of 'senior management personnel', but it is clear that to provide benefits 
to developing countries, any agreement in the GED services would have to 
provide for movement of semi-skilled and unskilled labour... It may be relevant 
here to note that the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement shows that 
movement of persons supplying services can be effectively incorporated into trade 
agreements."156  
   New Fields: data processing, research contracts and educational 
establishment  
    "This advent of information technology has enabled corporations from the 
developed countries to relocate some of the labour-intensive segments of their 
service activities to certain developing countries that offer suitable conditions and 
have lower wages. Labour-intensive data processing operations of U.S. 
corporations have been carried out in Caribbean countries. This kind of service 
export can play a role as foreign exchange earner and generator of employment in 
some countries. Another service export of this kind of rapidly increasing 
importance is software."157  
    "Computer software is the pride of the Indian business services exporters, 
having grown very rapidly during the second half of the 1980s, owing to both 
government policies aimed at developing exports in that sector and to the 
ingenuity of Indian software entrepreneurs. Until recently, the bulk of software 
exports by Indian firms came in the form of 'consulting services', also referred to 
in the industry as 'body shopping'. Under body shopping, the software firm 
provides system analysts and programmers as staff on projects that are managed 
by other firms. To their credit, however, Indian software firms have been moving 
upstream in recent years, by increasing their volume of work as prime contractors 
on customized software and turnkey systems integration projects, and in a few 
cases, by breaking into the packaged software market with their own products 
such as accounting software packages, banking software products, etc."158 In 
May 1991, it was reported that Motorola, a well known U.S. electronics group, is 
seeking Indian Government's approval to set up an export-oriented company with 
a string of manufacturing units (semi-conductors, portable and mobile telecom 
systems, cellular mobile radio equipment and radio paging systems) and that it is 
setting up a software export center at Bangalore, South-Central India, which will 
largely cater for the requirements of the Motorola group. a href=#foot159>159 
Bombay also has attractions, as a business and business-training center: in August 
1991, Swissair announced that it is transferring its revenue accounting activities to 
Bombay.160 But not everything goes smoothly with foreign interests in India: a 
number of foreign companies in Bangalore still prefer to export highly skilled 
Indian nationals --body-shopping--it was reported earlier this year, rather than buy 
computer software.161  
    Barbados, Jamaica, the Philippines, Singapore and Ireland have emerged as 
among the most popular "back office" locations for major corporations. The jobs 
range from simple data entry to accounting, medical transcription, telemarketing, 
and technical support for high-technology products.162 The reason, like in India, 
is much lower labour cost than in the developed country corporate headquarters, 
but this contributes to local employment. The other side of the coin is 
vulnerability of this "labour-intensive high-tech" strategy to advances in 
information technology, which have resulted in the sudden elimination of labour-
intensive segments of this industry.163 "One of the Ireland's chief competitors for foreign investment, Scotland, has deliberately steered clear of data processing. 
Robert Crawford, North American, says new technologies, director of the Locate 
in Scotland programme such as electronic scanning of printed material, will 
render many data-entry jobs obsolete. 'If you think this will create lots of jobs, 
you better be careful, you'll loose them' says Mr. Crawford...He says Scotland 
prefers to continue focusing on manufacturing, where the toe-to-toe battle with 
Ireland for foreign investment has raged for years, and continues."164  
    It is not only in data processing and information technology that export services 
jobs can be found. Bio-technologists in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, highly trained, 
work on contract for research institutes in the U.S. on projects of common 
interest. Both Colombia and Singapore export medical services from their newer 
medical and educational establishments. Some universities in Mexico and the 
Caribbean have large contingents of medial students from the United States.165  
    These developments in new service fields in the countries listed are both 
impressive and promising despite risks they involve in view of rapid 
technological changes in the newly established activities. But except in very small 
countries where labour force is small, these developments cannot change the 
fundamentals of unemployment and low real wages. In countries with large and 
mega-large populations, a sustained and broad-based change affecting agriculture, 
other primary activities, and manufacturing is needed in addition to the welcome 
growth of modern export-oriented service industries.  
   
E. RECIPROCITY  
    Analysts of services economics have been trying to find a solution to the 
problem of reciprocity of concessions between the developed and the developing 
countries within the Uruguay round. "The problem of reciprocity is that it is 
primarily developed countries which seek access commitments in developing 
country markets. The problem in the negotiations on trade in services is not the 
ability of developing countries to grant reciprocity, it is rather how developing 
countries will obtain reciprocity from developed countries in respect to any 
concessions they might agree to make...'Relative reciprocity' [concessions granted 
by developing countries matched by much more substantial liberalization by 
developed countries] has emerged in the negotiations as a means of calibrating 
developing country concessions in line with their development situation. 
However, the ability of developing country exporters to translate such 
liberalization into export gains appears extremely limited under the prevailing 
situation of asymmetry with respect to the factors on which competitiveness in 
trade in services depends."166  
    The answer provided by both the UNCTAD analysts and the OECD Secretariat 
is to search for solutions within the services sector.  "OECD Secretariat has recognized that 'the realization of developing 
countries' export potential in services will depend, in large measure, on the 
scope for acknowledgement [within] a services framework of the need for 
services to provide [for] mobility in the form of temporary relocation of 
essential personnel." 167 
   
    Suggestions offered by Messrs. Gibbs and Hayashi, UNCTAD analysts, are 
broader:  
"If liberalization in services is to benefit developing countries, their firms 
will have to acquire [a range of] capacities [such as those listed on page 3 
of this paper] which may only be possible in the context of solutions to the 
more general problems of debt and infrastructure development. It will also 
have to provide for access to foreign markets for their professional, skilled 
and unskilled labour, where this is essential to their ability to supply the 
service and compete against developed country firms."168 
   
    Messrs. Gibbs and Hayashi further suggest that possibilities that could be 
explored might include:  
        (a)    strict maintenance of the principle of symmetry between movement of 
capital  
                and movement  
                of  labour;  
        (b)    obligation of the developed country beneficiary of liberalization of 
service to transfer  
                service technology to the developing country;  
        (c)    reciprocity across service sectors, where market access concessions 
could be  
                provided in one sector to "pay" for liberalization in another (e.g. access 
to  
                developing country financial service markets exchanged for concessions 
in the areas  
                of construction, professional services, etc.).169  
   
    Going beyond the present discussion, three questions need to be answered in 
further analysis:  
        (a)    What is the degree of infant industry protection which developing 
countries need for  
                their service industries?  
        (b)   In view of the cyclical and other fluctuations affecting which the 
construction  
                industry, what allowance should be made for this instability in working out the  
                services concessions which need to be offered to developing countries?  
        (c)   It is quite possible that reciprocity cannot be achieved within the 
services sector. It is  
               unclear whether the shortfall in services will be compensated by 
concessions to  
               developing countries in access to markets for goods. An overall balance, 
maintenance  
               of peace and avoidance of massive migration from the developing to the 
developed  
               countries call for inclusion into the debate of the commodity problem 
and its possible  
               solution, and of the issue  of transfer of financial resources, its size and 
modalities.  
               Where and how will all these different aspects of the problem be pulled 
together, in  
                the interest of human development?  
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